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
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Editorial Note

The fall 2009 issue of the *Journal of International Business Disciplines* is presented to all hard working individuals who have been struggling with recent economic hardship that affected many citizens of the world.

I would like to express my appreciation to the President of Frostburg State University, Jonathan Gibraltar; Board of Directors of the International Academy of Business Disciplines; and my distinguished colleagues who served on *JIBD* Editorial Board, for making this publication possible.

My special thanks to Margaret Goralski, editor; Louis Falk, web coordinator; Reza Eftekharzadeh, IABD VP for Administration and Finance; and Robert Page, managing editor, for their outstanding contribution towards completion of this task.

The Editorial Board members and I hope that you enjoy reading this issue, and assure you of our commitment to continuously publishing high quality scholarly papers in the future issues of *JIBD*.

Ahmad Tootoonchi, Chief Editor
Journal of International Business Disciplines

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USING ONLINE LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE CURRICULUM

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ABSTRACT

The increasingly globalized environment in which firms operate, as well as recent changes in accreditation standards for business schools, require that educators prepare students for international business issues. A semester-long project pairing American undergraduate finance majors and Macedonian undergraduate business majors online was intended to allow students to experience both an international learning environment and internationally divergent perspectives of business issues. The project would also allow us to investigate both 'dissemination' and 'distance learning' scenarios given its international online learning environment. In the end, the project yielded different but equally valuable lessons for faculty and students in both countries regarding their international collaboration.

INTRODUCTION

Accreditation and the Globalization Trend

In January of 2009, the main accreditation body for business schools, Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business International (AACSB), proposed changes to three of its standards to emphasize the need for including global perspectives in curricula, calling for them to become effective in July 2009. These changes requiring global content are in addition to those made in 2003 when AACSB widely revised its standards in acknowledgement of the growing importance of international issues (AACSB, 2009; Trapnell, 2009). All of these requirements simply reflect the continuing trend of globalization, which requires educators and students to improve their international business knowledge.

While many institutions include an overseas learning component in their curricula, e.g., a study abroad or faculty development trips abroad, this option may not be feasible for all students or all schools given the costs and potential disruptions to work and family commitments. Providing an online connection between groups of students in different countries and cultures offers an appealing alternative. In addition, using international teams could produce economies of scale that then allow universities to specialize in their programs, or create synergies that improve general programs (Goralski, 2008). Establishing a distance learning model through an online

connection provides one solution to the accreditation challenge of increasing the global presence in the university curriculum.

Online learning environments

As a pedagogical benefit, online connections can enable the formation of a community-learning environment. Research has shown that learning is most effective when it is shared in a community environment (Kowch & Schwier, 1997; Lenning & Ebbers, 1999; Meisel & Marx, 1999; Rovai, 2002). The array of internet-based technologies such as Blackboard and Facebook makes creating a community for students in which to share their knowledge easier. Also, students can interact using a variety of telecommunications methods, from asynchronous threaded discussions to real-time chats.

However, while online learning communities are available, many undergraduate students are challenged for time to interact since an estimated 77% of college students are working and 26% of those are working full-time (Block, 2003). One result of this lifestyle in which students are going from class to work to home during a day is that there are limited opportunities for focused, concentrated online interactions. The student interactions, riddled with disruptions, can lead to disjointed exchanges and flawed decision-making (Kenway & Bullen, 2000; Speier, Valacich, & Vessey, 1999; Speier, Vessey, & Valacich, 2003). These interruptions and distractions are not unlike a work environment where an employee faces multiple projects and interactions taking place simultaneously. Learning to collaborate in an online learning environment prepares students for the future of virtual management teams.

Adding an international dimension can help prepare students to interact in a global economy. This is particularly important for business student preparation since many businesses have a global presence (Healey, 2008). Furthermore, international online learning communities not only promote interactions outside a student's "home borders" (Higgitt et al., 2008), but also cross-border communities can improve the quality of case discussions (Bonk, Hara, Dennen, Maikowski, & Supplee, 2000), a pedagogical approach often used within business school curricula. Indeed, in their comparative analysis of learning effectiveness via three forms of electronic communication, Yoo, Kanawattanachai, and Citurs (2002) found the form of electronic communication mattered less than the number of people collaborating on the quality of a case analysis. Thus, they propose that technological evolution will go beyond just reducing geographic distance and provide opportunities to enhance knowledge because of the easier exchange of diverse perspectives.

Research into online learning environments reveals, however, that it can be useful to implement them within a set of parameters to mitigate challenges arising from cultural differences, e.g., one culture may be generally more comfortable with debating concepts than another. (See Casamayor, Amandi, and Campo (2009) for an overview of general challenges students face in online learning environments.) Weinberger, Clark, Häkkinen, Tamura, and Fischer (2007) review two common environments, the dissemination scenario and the distance learning scenario, and analyze the role of external scripts, or guidelines, to promote effective interaction in either environment. The authors propose that further study would improve our understanding of the roles of the learning environments vis-à-vis different countries' cultures in producing

collaborative learning or project outcomes. Our project contributes to the literature then by using a “single, specific environment” – invoking the dissemination scenario – to investigate the communication interactions of culturally diverse and culturally similar groups – invoking the distance learning scenario – while using a partially-scripted set of guidelines.

Distance learning research finds many advantages exist (Offir, Lev, & Bezalel, 2008), but it also identifies several factors that influence outcomes to courses taught entirely online. Rovai (2002) reviews and summarizes the factors into seven areas: transactional distance, social presence, social equality, small group activities, group facilitation, teaching style and learning stage, and community size. Because attending to these elements can help promote the community aspect of an online learning environment, we took steps to address each of these factors (discussed below).

To both provide an online international community-learning environment—at an AACSB-accredited college with limited resources—as well as explore the interactions and decisions made by undergraduate business students when collaborating in culturally diverse groups, we developed a project that matched U.S. undergraduate finance students with undergraduate business students from Macedonia for online asynchronous communication. We next provide further context for learning communities and describe the project. We then discuss our experience with the project and its outcomes. Finally, we share some concluding thoughts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Virtual interactions occur on a daily basis. The internet allows us to send a message to someone down the hall or around the world. The dynamic nature of networking allows us to reach geographically in real time or asynchronously to expand our level of knowledge. Building from Wenger’s (1998) communities of practice, Wasko and Faraj (2005) suggest an electronic network of practice where knowledge-sharing occurs primarily through computer-based communication and with a loosely connected group.

Such shared information can be a valuable resource for organizations. Even more important is to learn how to share that information by collaborating with others and making meaning of the information (Carlsson, 2003). Internalizing the shared information enables employees to create tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is the most valuable type of knowledge to an organization because it represents expertise (Heaton & Taylor, 2002).

An environment where students can interact and share information leads to the creation of tacit knowledge. Students have the opportunity to construct meaning from the content in an online community atmosphere by sharing dynamic information (Smith & MacGregor, 1992). This sharing of information in a university setting is considered a learning community whereas in a work environment the term used is a community of practice (mutual engagement in a shared practice) (Lesser & Storck, 2001; Wenger, 1998). Although similar concepts, the community of practice assumes a core base of knowledge. In other words, participants must develop a shared practice which directly influences the behaviors and abilities of other participants. By sharing information within a forum and contributing to others’ understanding, participants create a community of practice – translating collective learning into social practices. The primary purpose of a community of practice is to develop knowledge and share that knowledge among

participants through insightful, efficient means. A learning community may not have a shared base of knowledge, but students can share, debate, and interact on information learned during a course to help prepare for the workplace.

Shared knowledge and the experience in creating it have become increasingly important in the last several years due to what Thomas Friedman calls the ‘flattening of the world’ (Friedman, 2005). Being aware of neighboring countries’ differing cultures and regulations can positively affect interactions and cooperation (Ackerman, Gross, & Perner, 2003). Indeed, one could argue that companies in other countries have typically operated in awareness of the differing cultures and regulations to compete in larger markets whereas U.S. companies, already participating in the largest market, usually did not need such awareness until more recently. Stated another way, because of globalization, companies will be seeking competitive advantage over companies not previously considered “one of the major players” (Sirkin, 2008). Therefore, it is particularly important that U.S. businesses increase their exposure to international business issues. It is for reasons such as these that the AACSB revised its accreditation standards to require more international exposure.

Although there is a push towards exposing students to cultural and procedural differences internationally, not all college students get the opportunity to see these differences firsthand. Creating a connection between students from different countries using online technology provides the opportunity to experience electronic networking and online learning communities while exposing them to international issues.

THE PROJECT

Outline

Capitalizing on the electronic network of practice, we taught two undergraduate business courses, geographically dispersed, in the fall of 2007. One course is an upper division capstone for senior finance majors at a medium-sized U.S. university. The other course, taught by a U.S. faculty member participating in a Fulbright fellowship to Macedonia, covered managerial accounting for second-year business students fluent in English (colleges in Macedonia are often three-year programs).

The capstone finance course implements a case study framework, primarily based on a seminar format. The students, during the semester, reviewed and examined seven cases focusing on different areas of finance (the cases originated from Bruner, 2002). We divided the class into seven groups, each group assigned to a specific company case. The seven parts of the course contained the same general format. The instructor began with a lecture on the finance material related to the specific case. The instructor then initiated discussion among the students regarding the details of the case, including the situation facing the case protagonist and the objectives of resolving this situation. The class typically included one course session to complete the assignments corresponding to their group. The *case group*, the student group assigned to the case under review, was responsible for a written case report, submitted to the instructor, and a formal presentation in front of classmates. The *brief groups*, the student groups not assigned to the current case under review, were responsible for a summary case report, submitted to the

instructor, and a list of prepared questions for the presenting case group. Each case study entailed three to four class sessions, or approximately two weeks of calendar time, for discussion, preparation, and presentation.

To create the electronic network of practice and develop a distance learning scenario, we paired U.S. students in their case groups with Macedonian students in the managerial accounting course. We added questions to each of the cases to incorporate an international perspective. Appendix A provides the handout given to the U.S. students, which was our form of an external script. The purpose of these added questions was to initiate interaction between the U.S. and Macedonian students. The questions follow the general topic of each case. However, since the Macedonian students did not have access to the specific case study text, the additional questions covered basic subject matter intended to elicit their perspective as Macedonians. For the dissemination scenario aspect, each case group was required to initiate and develop discussion with the Macedonian students using a single common environment, Microsoft's SharePoint Service. By using SharePoint, the students could post documents for each other, collaborate asynchronously or synchronously, and exchange messages with each other. This single environment would allow us to track and capture all interactions between the U.S. and Macedonian students so that we could conduct basic content analysis (Carney, 1972).

Experience

A difference in the timing of the semesters created an immediate challenge, an issue also raised by other researchers (e.g., Wresch, Arbaugh, & Rebstock, 2005). As is typical in the American education system, the U.S. university started in late August and met for approximately 16 weeks. Macedonian universities start fall semesters on October 1 and last 12 weeks. We allowed a couple of weeks for establishing a rapport between the Macedonian students and their new U.S. faculty member, after which time an introductory session to SharePoint and the project was held for them; thus, by the time we initiated the project the U.S. students were well into their semester. This resulted in a few of the U.S. groups having their case presentations due very soon after connections with their Macedonian counterparts were made. These U.S. students, trying to complete their presentations, would send very detailed and long messages in an effort to gather information more efficiently, which often overwhelmed the paired Macedonian students. On the other hand, while the remaining U.S. case groups had more time, they were well into their semester and other courses, so they did not always reply quickly to the Macedonian students who had sent a message introducing themselves, making it difficult for some of the Macedonian students to remain engaged in the project.

A second immediate challenge to the project was having enough Macedonian students participate. By Macedonian law, university students must be given the opportunity to take a comprehensive final that for all practical purposes replaces any grade earned in the course during the semester. As a result, there is little incentive for students to attend class regularly or do assigned projects. For example, while the Macedonian class had 27 students officially enrolled, 48% took the first exam, 33% took the second exam, and 19% took the third and last exam.

An ongoing challenge was differences in access to technology and attitudes towards using it. The U.S. students use many electronic forms of communication, with email and various message

boards, i.e., SharePoint and Blackboard, being primary forms of communication. This lies in sharp contrast with the Macedonian students, who rely almost exclusively on mobile phones and their text messaging capabilities. In addition, computers and laptops are not as common throughout Macedonia as they are in the U.S. With access hindered, a mind-set of checking and sending emails or posting messages is not as well developed in Macedonia as it is with the U.S. students. Therefore, even though the Macedonian college had a computer lab, the students were not habituated to use it. Thus, when the U.S. teams did post messages in SharePoint, often there was a long delay before the Macedonian teams would reply. These long delays made it difficult to remain engaged.

In an effort to counteract these issues, we took steps to promote the development of an online community, attempting to address Rovai's (2002) seven influential factors mentioned above. To reduce transactional distance, which increases with more instructor control but decreases with more student control via discussion, we did not dictate when or how many interactions had to occur. However, we did follow the researched recommendation to make participation a graded component. To encourage social presence yet not affect transactional distance, both faculty made a point of asking nearly weekly how many students had posted messages and showing interest and excitement in the project itself.

Social equality was somewhat more complex to address given not only the typical gender and cultural differences, but also differences in comfort levels with the English language. Besides holding frank discussions to make both the U.S. and Macedonian students simply aware of this issue, we reinforced it with written guidelines (see Appendix A). In addition, the Macedonian students were given time and encouragement during the introductory session to work together and co-write their initial messages to their U.S. counterparts.

At the start of the project, we believed we addressed having small group activities by pairing each U.S. team, which ranged in size from 3 to 4 students, to a Macedonian team of 3 to 4 students. However, it became clear after a few weeks that there were not enough Macedonian students attending class consistently to do this, and so this factor became difficult to address. Eventually, the pairings had only one or two Macedonian students assigned, and sometimes an individual Macedonian student tried to field questions from two U.S. teams.

To support group facilitation, especially as the project progressed and the challenges became clearer, we tried to follow common recommendations, e.g., re-configuring the Macedonian teams to better allocate responsibilities and encouraging those students playing key roles such as 'standard setter' and 'compromiser.' We also risked increasing transactional distance by taking time in classes at one point to have the students log in to SharePoint and post or reply to messages.

On the one hand, the factor teaching style and learning style did not apply directly since this project was intended to have the students communicate rather than learn course content as is done in a regular, complete distance learning course. On the other hand, it could be argued that even for such a relatively small project, it is precisely due to differences in the traditional Macedonian teaching and learning styles as compared to the U.S. styles that the project was a challenge to implement. As one example, the U.S. students were entirely comfortable with the

self-directed style of the project, in which they needed to initiate and compose messages to gain information from another person. In contrast, the traditional Macedonian education system is hierarchical and authoritarian. The students were unfamiliar and thus, uncomfortable, with being empowered and entrusted to write their own thoughts in their own way. While the Macedonian college is new and was started by faculty specifically to provide an alternative to this traditional education system, the students were beginning only their second year and found it hard to adapt to and adopt this new independence.

Another factor we were unable to address was community size. Research indicates a minimum of eight to ten participants can be adequate to develop communicative interaction. Given the other differences that existed, we were unable to reach a critical mass to create an effective international online learning–community.

Concluding Remarks

Research suggests that establishing an effective international electronic network of practice has significant potential in enhancing the international exposure of a university curriculum. It can provide value to many undergraduate students otherwise unable to have an international experience. Such an online learning–community environment can also leverage existing university programs at both the U.S. and international institutions. For example, it allows faculty already involved in international activities the option to incorporate international perspectives without the semester-long commitment that comes with formally enrolling the distant students. However, while extensive research exists suggesting “best practices” for developing and managing virtual teams, in our project we found a few obvious but non-trivial basic institutional issues that need to be considered along with those positive controls. We believe these are important considerations when educators and institutions are looking at creating an international experience.

Different start and end dates to the semesters for the collaborating institutions as well as the timing and number of national holidays observed can significantly compress the actual usable timeframe for developing, working within, and reflecting upon the online learning–community environment. A collaborative project can wind up allotted only several weeks rather than a few months. The different semester and holiday schedules can also impact the attention and time given to the collaborative environment by students so that they are mismatched, such as when one institution’s group is approaching mid-terms but the other is still early in the start of its semester.

A more striking difference in the educational systems that caused challenges is in assessment or examination policies. Students anywhere are often motivated to do various activities, e.g., projects, homework, and chapter readings, by grades. While the policy is slowly changing, in many European countries a single end-of-term exam is commonplace, with little value placed on attending lectures. When the collaborating institutions have significantly different methods and timeframes to their evaluations, student motivation to engage in the learning–community can differ by timing and magnitude, hindering the development of the project. Understanding how the educational system works and then being able to create an incentive system would enhance the interactions.

Last, while the communication tool used may not influence the interaction, Yoo et al. (2002) suggest that the quality of interaction may improve with a stronger initial relationship among students. Thus, while working within the constraints above, allowing time for more personal communications prior to course-related discussions could improve the rapport between geographically diverse student groups as well as establish a better communication link once the discussions commence.

Although the rationale, infrastructure, and several best practices for creating an international online learning-community environment were in place for the virtual interactions, our electronic network of practice crumbled. Granted, a limitation to our project is that we were unable to formally capture student perspectives and hence, this is a relatively exploratory study. However, an arguably positive outcome was that students in both countries experienced first-hand how cultural issues related to education differences and attitudes towards technology can impact project outcomes. As the students gain knowledge of and experience in a more professional setting, this project should provide perspective that cultural differences are not trivial matters for businesses to deal with when operating in a global economy

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APPENDIX A: PROJECT GUIDELINES HANDOUT PROVIDED TO U.S. STUDENTS

Discussion points for Bus 409-Macedonian (MK) student teams

NOTE: Where appropriate share your perspectives on the following questions and topics as you ask them of the MK students. Also, understand that you will most likely have to alter the wording of the questions and points you are trying to get across to accommodate differences in language, therefore, do not simply “cut and paste” the items below into SharePoint and ask for responses. Engage in meaningful chats. And lastly, feel free to let the conversations flow and expand as the opportunities arise. You have a chance here to chat with another university business student in a foreign country. Make the most of it!

Case 1: The Body Shop

- The CEO stresses The Body Shop’s focus on social change and action.
 - o How much importance should firms place on social issues? How should social activism rank compared to increasing shareholder value?
 - o How might this view change for entrepreneurs and small businesses?
- The Body Shop needs to forecast its financing needs in the near future. Discuss your perceptions of how easy or difficult it is for small businesses to obtain financing for their operations. What sources are available in the U.S. and Macedonia for entrepreneurial financing?

Case 2: Coke vs. Pepsi

- Besides Coke and Pepsi colas, are the MK students familiar with the other products each firm sells, e.g., Coke’s Nestea line of products?
 - o Where do they buy them (the other product lines or the colas), i.e., grocery store, convenience stores, vending machines in schools, etc.?
 - o How and where are they advertised, e.g., TV, radio, flyers, sport team sponsors?
 - o How are they perceived by little kids versus college students versus adults, i.e., as “cool”, too American, for older people only, etc.?
- What are the most popular similar products, i.e., if not Minute Maid OJ then what firm/brand (and located in what country) sells the popular line of OJ?
- p. 206 discusses changes in the beverage industry: Each side is to share what they feel are the most important or popular drinks among kids vs. college-age students vs. adults.
- Each side is to share how they think an entrepreneur or small business that wishes to get into his/her respective home market with a new drink or product that would compete against Coke and Pepsi should go about it. Be sure to address issues such as target customer profile and price-place-promotion components.
- In general, try to determine the challenges and opportunities Coke and Pepsi face now and maybe in the future as they try to have a presence in MK.

Case 3: Euroland Foods

- p. 305 mentions the firm going public: Each side is to describe their perceptions of how easy or difficult it is to list a firm on an exchange.
 - o Which stock market in the world is perceived to be the “best” or most prestigious?
- p. 307 mentions stocks, bonds, dividends: Each side is to describe the roles of these securities and dividends in the general public’s wealth and retirement plans.
 - o In addition to or instead of using the capital markets for creating and managing wealth and retirement, what does the general public use and rely upon (in USA and in MK)?
- How do the MK students expect their answers to the above questions to change when MK joins the European Union?
- In general, try to compare and contrast the roles of the financial markets in USA and MK.

Case 4: Rosario Acero

- p. 430 mentions the role of relationships in the different businesses: Each side describe the role of relationships, family, networking, 3rd-party recommendations, prior relevant work experience, school pedigree, etc. in doing business and advancing in business or simply getting business done.
- p. 432 describes work hours, pay, and unions. Each side describe these, e.g., what is typical pay, hours in a work week, the role of unions, public perception of unions, etc.

Case 5: Carrefour

- Have MK students share their perceptions of whether joining the EU is worthwhile, how it is influencing what is happening in MK and businesses there, whether the original concept of the EU is “working,” and what role the euro has in MK society.
- Each side describe the role the foreign exchange market and its quotes play in their day-to-day lives.
- In general, try to understand better the influence the EU has “over there” and the impact foreign exchange markets have on MK.

Case 6: Enron

- The case is about the role of weather: Each side describe the weather in their area, the role of A/C and heat and gas/electric supplies, e.g., how reliable is each, who receives it (Firms? Residents? Government offices?), how expensive is each?
- Each side describe attitudes about global warming and the role, if any, business (and individuals) is taking to address it.

Case 7: Yeats Valves and Controls

- p. 586 describes the role of foreign customers and markets: Each side describe the role of and debates surrounding 'outsourcing' in their respective economies.
 - o What are the perceptions of the general public towards foreign-made products?
 - o What are the predominant industries around Idaho vs. MK?
 - o What are some emerging industries?
 - o What are job prospects like for college-age students?
- How important is intellectual property in the USA vs. MK, i.e., is it protected by laws, do people 'trust' the 'system/markets' to protect them?

ANTECEDENTS AND OUTCOMES OF WFC: RACIOETHNIC DIFFERENCES AMONG WORKING PROFESSIONALS WITH FAMILIES

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ABSTRACT

As the U.S. workplace becomes more heterogeneous, it is essential that managers understand the concerns of diverse employees. This paper examines racioethnic differences that are likely to influence the antecedents (e.g., role overload, conflict, and ambiguity) and outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction-work, pay, promotion, supervision, and coworkers) affecting the U.S. workplace. In addition, we measure two distinct dimensions of work-family conflict (WFC), work interfering with family conflict (WIFC) and family interfering with work conflict (FIWC). Using a comparative sample and structural equation modeling, our findings explain the divergent viewpoints of Blacks and Whites regarding role stress, WFC, and job satisfaction facets. This underscores the important role of subgroup analyses comparison. Implications and limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research are presented as well.

INTRODUCTION

Work-family conflict (WFC) and its antecedents and outcomes have been an area of great interest to researchers. While there is much research on WFC, there is a dearth of research that examines the racioethnic differences of antecedents and outcomes among the U.S. workforce. In the only relevant work we have found to have a comparable sample of Blacks and Whites, Frone, Russell, and Cooper (1992) reported that a racioethnic difference did not exist, and therefore, the model appeared to be generalizable across both racial groups.

According to the *U.S. Census Bureau* (1996), trends suggest that by the year 2020, minority groups (e.g., Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians) will make up a significant portion of the workforce. Given the changing demographics of the workforce since the 1980s, it is critical that empirical research efforts on the work-family interface be conducted addressing minority racioethnic populations in the workplace (e.g., Brockwood, 2007; Casper, Eby, Bordeaux, Lockwood, & Lambert, 2007; Kossek & Ozeki, 1998). As a result, proactive managers should be familiar with WFC issues amid a racioethnically diverse workforce; establish work-family policies that will be acceptable to members of different racioethnic communities; and consider alternative approaches to motivating, directing, and coaching workers.

Prior research (e.g., Butler, Grzywacz, Bass, & Linney, 2005; Judge & Colquitt, 2004) has mainly used White samples, and frequently, minority group members were collapsed into a nebulous “non-White” category, as if all minority groups are homogenous. Therefore, we believe that comparing racioethnic groups adds to the richness of the existing body of knowledge and may be of use to human resources practitioners. Thus, the purpose of this research is to examine a structural equation model of the relationship between role stress and the facets of job satisfaction within our WFC model by comparing Blacks and Whites. We provide theoretical underpinnings for WFC (Hobfoll, 1989) and use a social psychological theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to develop the research hypotheses.

Theory and Hypotheses

Work–family research has rarely been established or embedded in a specific theory (Grandey & Cropanzano, 1999). Generally, the conceptual foundation utilized for WFC is role theory, which posits that individuals play multiple roles in their lives, and that participation in one role depletes the amount of resources from participation in another role (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964). However, role theory has some limitations when applied to work–family conflict studies. When applied, role theory has overlooked family roles, which is essentially important in understanding the work–family relationship.

Therefore, the Conservation of Resources (COR) model (Hobfoll, 1989) may be a more appropriate conceptual model for work–family research because it is a more general stress theory that explains the intersection of the work and family domains; in addition, it offers a strong framework (e.g., Cullen & Hammer, 2007; Premeaux, Adkins, & Mossholder, 2007). The COR model proposes that “individuals seek to acquire and maintain resources” (Grandey & Cropanzano, 1999, p. 352). Hobfoll (1989) defines resources as “those objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that are valued by the individual or that serve as a means for attainment of these objects” (p. 516). Hence, stress results if an individual perceives a potential loss of resources, expects a resource gain that does not happen, or suffers an actual loss of resources.

With regard to the aspect of this study that examines racioethnic differences, the social identity theory presents the theoretical underpinning. According to Tajfel (1982), social identity theory explains the relationship between social structures and individual identity through the meanings people attach to their membership in identity groups, such as racioethnic groups. So, these meanings characterize the way individuals interact with others from their own identity groups or from other groups (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The meaning of intergroup relations consists of “any aspect of human interaction that involves individuals perceiving themselves as members of a social category or being perceived by others as belonging to a social category” (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994, p. 6). Thus, social identity theory is an individual’s self concept that is characterized by his or her attachment level felt toward the group and membership in a specific group. The conservation of resources model and social identity theory collectively provide the theoretical framework for this study, which moderates the relationships between role stress and WFC, and WFC and job satisfaction facets to explore whether racioethnicity has some interactive influence.

Work–Family Conflict

Several management scholars (Carlson & Kacmar, 2000; Frone, Russell, & Cooper, 1992; Gutek, Seale, & Klepa, 1991) have identified two dimensions of WFC: conflict due to work interfering with family (WIFC) and conflict due to family interfering with work (FIWC). WIFC can be described as “a form of interrole conflict in which the general demands of time devoted to and strain created by the job interfere with performing family-related responsibilities” (Netemeyer, Boles, & McMurrian, 1996, p. 401). In contrast, FIWC can be identified as “a form of interrole conflict in which the general demands of, time devoted to, and strain created by the family interfere with performing work-related responsibilities” (Netemeyer et al., 1996, p. 401). Both WIFC and FIWC essentially result from an individual’s attempt to meet an abundance of different conflicting demands from the work and family roles.

Antecedents of WFC

In this study, role stress will be conceptualized as role overload, conflict, and ambiguity. Coverman (1989) found that “role overload leads to role conflict only when the demands of one of the multiple roles make it difficult to fulfill the demands of another role” (p. 968). Role overload occurs when an individual has too many role demands and too little time to fulfill them (Baruch, Biener, & Barnett, 1987; Rapoport & Rapoport, 1976). According to Kahn et al. (1964), role conflict is defined as “the simultaneous occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures such that compliance with one would make more difficult compliance with the other” (p. 19). Previous research has linked role conflict to role ambiguity because role conflict appears to be attached to role behavior (Kahn et al., 1964; Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970). Role ambiguity occurs when an individual lacks a clear definition about the behavior expected in a role and the required methods to fulfill his or her duties (Kahn et al., 1964; Rizzo et al., 1970). Therefore, we advance that using these three forms of role stress will create a more comprehensive model that promotes a better understanding of the relationship between role stress and WFC because there is an interrelationship among role stress (i.e., role overload leads to role conflict, which has been linked to role ambiguity).

For instance, prior studies (Boyar, Maertz, Pearson, & Keough, 2003; Carlson & Kacmar, 2000) found that role conflict and role overload were positive predictors of WIFC; however, role ambiguity was not a significant predictor of WIFC. Carlson and Kacmar (2000) reported that role conflict and role ambiguity were positively related to FIWC; however, FIWC was not significantly related to role overload. Consistent with the COR model, we believe that experiencing high levels of conflict at work might reduce available resources and leave fewer resources available for family demands, or vice versa. Furthermore, the COR model proposes that stress is a reaction to the interrole conflict encountered because resources are lost in the process of juggling both work responsibilities and family obligations. Based on the previous discussion, we advance that a significant relationship will exist between role stress (i.e., role overload, conflict, and ambiguity) and WIFC and/or FIWC and offer the following hypotheses:

H1: (a) Role conflict, (b) role ambiguity, and (c) role overload will be positively related to FIWC and/or WIFC.

Racioethnic Differences among Antecedents of WFC

Diversity in the workplace is a paramount, salient, and ongoing matter confronting corporate America to date. The question is not whether a corporation should address and foster diversity at every level in the organization, but how well it is being targeted, valued, and managed. Thus, the importance of racioethnicity impacting work–family conflict cannot be overemphasized.

Because of the influence of interactions shaped by the social identity theory, individuals from diverse racioethnic backgrounds are expected to demonstrate role stress related to WIFC and FIWC; however, it may be different. For instance, African American stereotypes are distinctly negative as compared to those of other racioethnic groups (Bell, 1985; Crocker & Major, 1989; Kirschenman & Neckerman, 1991), which can be associated with greater encounters of discrimination and prejudice. In addition, Whites reported the least occurrences of discrimination at work and in general, as compared to their Black counterparts (Bell, Harrison, & McLaughlin, 1997; Utsey, Chae, Brown, and Kelly, 2002). Therefore, other racioethnic groups are less likely to translate vague workplace events in racioethnic terms and encounter less discrimination than Blacks. These events should intensify the importance that Blacks place on diversity as a method of diminishing the seriousness of the actual (or alleged) discriminatory encounters at work (Mor Barak, Cherin, & Berkman, 1998).

Based upon the aforementioned research conducted on the relationship between role stress and WFC, we believe that these findings may be sample specific, since the extant literature is devoid of large Black samples. Derived from the previous discussion and social identity theory, we advance that a racioethnic difference will exist between WIFC/FIWC and role stress (i.e., role overload, conflict, and ambiguity) and offer the following hypotheses:

H2: There exists a difference between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between (a) role conflict, (b) role ambiguity, and (c) role overload and WIFC.

H3: There exists a difference between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between (a) role conflict, (b) role ambiguity, and (c) role overload and FIWC.

Relationship between WIFC and FIWC

WIFC and FIWC are considered distinct constructs, and scholars have demonstrated they are positively correlated (Boyar et al., 2003; Carlson & Kacmar, 2000; Frone et al., 1992). We conjecture that if the levels of conflict from the work domain are strong enough to impact family roles, then the levels of stress in the family domain might cause work conflict. Therefore, we argue the work domain variables related to WIFC would indirectly affect the FIWC construct. Carlson and Kacmar (2000) examined the importance of life role values and their influence on the way that WIFC and FIWC were experienced. They found positive and significant paths between WIFC and FIWC. Other scholars have found identical results regarding the relationship between FIWC and WIFC (Boyar et al., 2003; Frone et al., 1992). Given these interrelationships, it is a constant balancing act as employees determine a degree of job devotion that maintains the appropriate level of actual or perceived work performance. This subsequently may cause

conflict between the work and family and indirectly affect FIWC or vice versa. Thus, we suggest:

H4: There will be a positive relationship between FIWC and WIFC.

Racioethnic Differences between the Relationship of WIFC and FIWC

Cianni and Romberger (1995) proposed that Blacks perceived that the corporate culture is a “country club” with limited access for themselves. As a result, Blacks perceived that the glass ceiling appears to be much lower than they thought it would be. These beliefs may influence their perceptions because Blacks may feel that they have to work twice as hard in order to have access to the same opportunities that Whites encounter with half the work. Due to these perceptions, the lack of support from work for Blacks may increase the conflict between the work and family as compared to their White counterparts. Given these perceptions, along with social identity theory, which suggests individual attachment to their own identity groups, differences are expected between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between WIFC and FIWC. In light of the prior discussion, there has been a neglect to determine if a difference exists between Blacks and Whites in respect to their relationship between WIFC and FIWC; therefore, we evaluate the following hypothesis:

H5: There exists a difference between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between FIWC and WIFC.

Outcomes of WFC

Locke (1976) characterizes job satisfaction as “a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experiences” (p. 1297). Job satisfaction is an important work-related attitude among workers in various employment settings. Earlier studies used global measures of job satisfaction instead of measuring employee job satisfaction across its various dimensions or facets (Bedeian, Burke, & Moffett, 1988; Boles & Babin, 1996; Decker & Borgen, 1993; Good, Sisler, & Gentry, 1988; Noor, 2004). To accurately measure job satisfaction, several characteristics of the job may need to be evaluated in hopes of obtaining a broad measure of employee beliefs and attitudes about the job (Churchill, Ford, & Walker, 1974; Gregson, 1991). Since numerous dimensions may not be equally important to each individual, it is possible that two employees who have identical overall job satisfaction scores may not in fact be equally satisfied with their particular job. In the current study, job satisfaction is accessed across the five dimensions: work, pay, promotion, supervision, and coworkers.

Boles, Howard, and Donofrio (2001) found a negative relationship between WIFC and two facets of job satisfaction: job satisfaction-work and job satisfaction-promotion. In another study, Boles, Wood, and Johnson (2003) found that a negative relationship exists between WIFC and job satisfaction-pay, job satisfaction-promotion, and job satisfaction-supervision. In a previous study that examined the relationship between the facets of job satisfaction and FIWC, Boles et al. (2001) reported a negative relationship between FIWC and the job satisfaction-coworker facet. The COR model proposes that conflict between an employees’ work obligations and family responsibilities depletes resources, or stimulates the perception of depleted resources, leading to

negative outcomes such as lower job satisfaction, inferior performance, and lower commitment. Considering the prior discussion, we expect that employees will report varying degrees of satisfaction across the five facets of job satisfaction and therefore evaluate the following hypothesis:

H6: FIWC and/or WIFC will be negatively related to job satisfaction with (a) work, (b) pay, (c) promotion, (d) supervision, and (e) coworkers

Racioethnic Differences among Outcomes of WFC

Even though the relationship between WFC and the job satisfaction facets have not been examined between Blacks and Whites, there has been mixed results on much of the research comparing Blacks' and Whites' differences on job satisfaction. Black workers in a wide variety of occupations, including blue collar workers (Milutinovich, 1977; Tuch & Martin, 1991), social work faculty members (Davis, 1985), and low and mid-level managers (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990), reported lower levels of job satisfaction than White workers. Conversely, research with an assortment of professions, including patrol officers (Buzawa, 1984) and white collar workers (Brenner & Fernsten, 1984), found that White employees reported lower levels of job satisfaction than did their Black employees. Thus, with respect to job satisfaction among Black and White workers, the pattern of findings has not been clear.

The social identity theory asserts that individuals' identification with a group is linked with attitudes at work, such as job satisfaction, performance, and employee turnover (Joshi, Liao, & Jackson, 2006; Slattery & Selvarajan, 2005). However, the extant literature is devoid of large samples of Blacks. We believe that the findings of subsequent studies may be sample specific. In view of the previous literature and social identity theory, we expect that racioethnic differences exist across the five facets of job satisfaction and WIFC and FIWC; therefore, we offer the following hypotheses for evaluation:

H7: There exists a difference between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between WIFC and job satisfaction with (a) work, (b) pay, (c) promotion, (d) supervision, and (e) coworkers.

H8: There exists a difference between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between FIWC and job satisfaction with (a) work, (b) pay, (c) promotion, (d) supervision, and (e) coworkers.

METHOD

Our data was collected via a web survey from various United States citizens, including employees from a southeastern state agency, alumni of northeastern and southern universities, and graduate business students employed in diverse organizations, across various functional areas. The criteria for inclusion in our study were that the participant be employed in an organization, work at least forty hours per week, and have a spouse or at least one child under the age of 18. Interested individuals who met these criteria were electronically sent an invitational letter with a link to the survey entitled, 'Job Satisfaction Survey.' The electronic invitational letter explained the purpose of the survey with the link included. Participants were instructed to complete and submit the questionnaire online. To increase the response rate, two electronic

reminders were sent to the same email addresses in two-week increments after the initial invitational letter.

Procedures

We sent 1263 electronic invitational surveys to prospective research participants, and 495 useable surveys were completed. However, since some participants did not meet the criteria of having a spouse and/or child(ren), 205 were eliminated, bringing the qualified total to 290 participants. After eliminating other racioethnic groups because they did not meet the recommended minimum sample size of 100 to ensure stable maximum likelihood estimation (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2005), the final sample consisted of 276, for a response rate of 26.1 percent (i.e., $1263 - 205 = 1058$; $276/1058$). The cross-sectional sample consisted of 276 participants: 175 Blacks (63.4%).

Sample Demographics

Of the 175 Black participants, 77.7% were women and approximately 80% had children. In terms of marital status, 21.1% were single, 64.0% were married, and a small percentage (13.7%) was divorced. Over ninety percent of the Black participants were between the ages of 21 and 50. The number of years that Blacks worked for the organization is as follows: less than 3 years (36.0%), 4-8 years (29.1%), 9-15 years (19.4%), 16-24 years (9.7%), 25 years or more (4.0%), and 1.7% did not respond to this item. Of the 101 Whites, there were 46 men (45.5%) and approximately 63% had children. In terms of marital status, 5.9% were single, 86.1% were married, and a small percentage (6.9%) was divorced. Over eighty percent of the Whites were between the ages of 21 and 50. The number of years that White participants worked for the organization is as follows: less than 3 years (31.7%), 4-8 years (36.6%), 9-15 years (19.8%), 16-24 years (4.0%), and 25 years or more (7.9%).

Measures

We measured the constructs by using the following instruments found in the work-family research literature.

Role Stress

This scale is a comprehensive conceptualization, extensive enough to measure stress in relation to work and family roles of both men and women (Bohen & Viveros-Long, 1981). This instrument assessed role overload with six items, role conflict with four items, and role ambiguity with three items using (1) N/A and (2) Very Rarely to (7) Always. An example item from the instrument for role overload is "I feel physically drained when I get home from work." An example item from the instrument for role conflict is "My job keeps me away from my family too much." An example item for role ambiguity is "I worry whether I should work less and spend more time with my children." The alphas for role overload, role conflict, and role ambiguity for Blacks were .790, .597, and .555 and for Whites were .801, .554, and .724, respectively. Although the reliability for role conflict for both subgroups (Blacks' alpha = 0.597 and Whites' alpha = 0.554) and role ambiguity for Blacks were low (Blacks' alpha = 0.555), a

confirmatory factor analysis revealed that each item used to measure the construct was statistically significant, and thus the construct was deemed acceptable for research purposes and included in the structural equation model.

Work–Family Conflict

WIFC and FIWC were measured using the Netemeyer et al. (1996) scales. These measures both contain five items. These instruments used a seven-point response scale ranging from (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. Higher scores are associated with greater inter-domain conflict for each scale. An example item from the WIFC scale is “I often have to miss important family activities because of my job.” An example item from the FIWC scale is “I sometimes have to miss work so that family responsibilities are met.” The alphas for WIFC and FIWC were .927 and .734 for Blacks and .941 and .761 for Whites, respectively.

Job Satisfaction Facets

This study used the Job Satisfaction Scale (JSS) developed by Gregson (1991) that identified the five dimensions of job satisfaction: work, pay, promotion, supervision, and coworkers. The JSS is a 30-item instrument that uses a 7-point Likert scale with responses ranging from (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. Some example items are “My work is boring” and “My coworkers are slow.” Cronbach’s alpha values for work, pay, promotion, supervisor, and coworkers were .855, .816, .771, .878, and .803 for Blacks and .821, .894, .921, .887, and .881 for Whites, respectively.

Method of Analysis

We used structural equation modeling (path analysis) to evaluate the hypotheses. The family and work conflict model was developed using the Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) computer program developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993). The covariance matrix was used as the input for all models, and the maximum likelihood estimation procedure was employed to produce the model parameters.

To evaluate model fit, we utilized measures of absolute fit and incremental fit to determine how well our data fit the hypothesized model (Hair et al., 2005). The absolute fit measures, maximum likelihood ratio chi-square statistic (χ^2), and goodness-of-fit index (GFI), provide a measure of the extent to which the covariance matrix estimated by the hypothesized model reproduces the observed covariance matrix (James & Brett, 1984). The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) was also considered as it approximates the amount of error present in the model. Another fit index, the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), or Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), was used to assess model fit; the NNFI assesses a penalty for adding additional parameters to the model. The normed fit index (NFI) was used because it assesses a model’s fit in relation to the worst and best fit attainable, rather than as a sole function of the difference between the reproduced and observed covariance matrices (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). The comparative fit index (CFI), containing similar attributes to the NFI, compares the predicted covariance matrix to the observed covariance matrix, and is least affected by sample size.

RESULTS

The means, standard deviations, reliability estimates, and zero-order correlations are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 for Blacks and Whites, respectively. As shown in these two tables, support was established for H1 because role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload were positively related to both FIWC and WIFC.

Model Fit

The two-step approach to structural equation modeling was employed (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). First, the measurement model was inspected for satisfactory fit indices. After establishing satisfactory model fit, the structural coefficients were interpreted. Because we chose to evaluate two groups (Blacks and Whites), we also employed the multi-sample approach to evaluate the moderator effects of race.

Similar to Brown, Knouse, Stewart, and Beale (2009), our study utilized a multi-sample model that was tested to assess the differences between Blacks and Whites. Overall, the measurement model had acceptable fit indices (see Table 3). That is, the Chi-square statistic was at its minimum, and the *p*-value was nonsignificant. The GFI was above its recommended threshold level of 0.90 (Hair et al., 2005), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) was less than 0.08, indicative of an acceptable model (Steiger & Lind, 1980). The Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom coefficient was less than three, which indicates acceptable model fit (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1995). The CFI, NFI, and NNFI all indicated an acceptable fit of the model to the data. In addition, all normalized residuals were less than two, which further indicates that the data fit the hypothesized model.

Table 4 displays the structural coefficients for the models. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c examined whether role stress (i.e., role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload) was positively related to FIWC and WIFC. Role stress was only related to WIFC and was not related to FIWC. That is, role conflict ($\beta = .141, p < .10$, moderate) and role ambiguity ($\beta = .777, p < .05$) were positively related, and role overload ($\beta = -.562, p < .05$) was negatively related to WIFC, although, in the opposite direction. Further, role stress (i.e., role conflict, $\beta = .822, ns$; role ambiguity, $\beta = .387, ns$; role overload, $\beta = .982, ns$), was not significantly related to FIWC. Therefore, partial support was established for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, or 1c.

When closely examining the relationships by race, there were similarities and differences between the total sample of blacks and whites. Similar to the total sample, Whites had a positive relationship between role conflict and WIFC ($\beta = .183, p < .05$). Also, role conflict ($\beta = .112, ns$) and role ambiguity ($\beta = .224, ns$) were not significantly related to FIWC for Blacks, and role overload was not significantly related to FIWC ($\beta = -.011, ns$) for Whites. However, contrary to the total sample, neither Blacks ($\beta = -.062, ns$) nor Whites ($\beta = -.012, ns$) had a significant relationship between role ambiguity and WIFC, even though the total sample did. In addition, a positive relationship did not exist between role conflict and WIFC for Blacks ($\beta = .208, ns$). Although the Black ($\beta = .663, p < .05$) and White ($\beta = .938, p < .05$) groups had a significant relationship between role overload and WIFC, it was positively significant as compared to the

TABLE 1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS, AND RELIABILITY ESTIMATES FOR WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT BLACK MODEL

Var	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2.00	1.22	(.93)									
2	1.34	0.67	.39**	(.73)								
3	2.64	0.79	.54**	.28	(.79)							
4	1.80	0.56	.24**	.14	.25**	(.60)						
5	0.82	0.40	.21**	.20**	.35**	.18*	(.56)					
6	3.87	0.97	-.02	.12	-.00	-.00	.04	(.86)				
7	1.50	0.75	-.04	-.05	-.08	-.03	-.07	.11	(.82)			
8	2.25	0.85	.02	.14	-.05	.07	.09	.31**	.13	(.77)		
9	3.58	1.10	-.25**	.01	-.26**	-.11	-.13	.29**	.09	.22**	(.88)	
10	3.90	0.82	-.12	-.20**	-.09	-.04	-.11	.19*	.08	.18*	.41**	(.80)

Note. Reliability estimates are on the diagonals in parentheses. 1 = work interfering with family conflict; 2 = family interfering with work conflict; 3 = role overload; 4 = role conflict; 5 = role ambiguity; 6 = job satisfaction-work; 7 = job satisfaction-pay; 8 = job satisfaction-promotion; 9 = job satisfaction-supervision; 10 = job satisfaction-coworker.

n = 175 for Blacks.

p* < .05. *p* < .01.

TABLE 2. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS, AND RELIABILITY ESTIMATES FOR WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT WHITE MODEL

Var	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2.22	1.15	(.94)									
2	1.13	0.54	.30**	(.76)								
3	2.05	0.56	.59**	.24*	(.80)							
4	2.41	0.60	.58**	.40**	.52**	(.55)						
5	0.84	0.43	.44**	.37**	.43**	.49**	(.72)					
6	3.15	0.64	.03	.03	-.08	-.08	-.02	(.82)				
7	3.29	1.27	-.18	.06	-.31**	-.17	-.12	.07	(.89)			
8	3.50	1.35	-.10	.10	-.23**	-.11	-.01	.39**	.51**	(.92)		
9	4.06	1.23	-.33**	-.12	-.33**	-.29**	-.15	.27**	.28**	.36**	(.89)	
10	3.08	0.75	-.27**	-.06	-.16	-.33**	-.10	.35**	.38**	.54**	.45**	(.88)

Note. Reliability estimates are on the diagonals in parentheses. WIFC = work interfering with family conflict; FIWC = family interfering with work conflict; RO = role overload; RC = role conflict; RA = role ambiguity; JSWK = job satisfaction-work; JSP = job satisfaction-pay; JSPR = job satisfaction-promotion; JSS = job satisfaction-supervision; JSC = job satisfaction-coworker.

n = 101 for Whites.

p* < .05. *p* < .01.

TABLE 3. FIT INDICES FOR THE MULTI-GROUP WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT MEASUREMENT MODEL

Model	$\chi^2(df)$	p-value	χ^2/df	RMSEA	GFI	NNFI	NFI	CFI
Baseline	30.461(36)	0.7290	0.8462	.001	.962	1.02	.943	1.00

Note. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses after the Chi-square value. RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; GFI = Goodness-of-fit index; TLI = Non-Normed Fit Index; NFI = Normed Fit index; CFI = Comparative Fit index; df = Degrees of freedom.
 $n = 276$ (175 Blacks and 101 Whites)

total sample, which was negatively significant. Finally, role conflict ($\beta = .266, p < .05$) and role ambiguity ($\beta = .287, p < .05$) were positively related to FIWC for Whites, and role overload was positively related to FIWC for Blacks ($\beta = .294, p < .05$).

Concerning the positive relationship between FIWC and WIFC, no support was found for hypothesis 4 ($\beta = .136, ns$). Contradictory to the total sample, FIWC was a significant predictor of WIFC for Blacks ($\beta = .611, p < .05$) and Whites ($\beta = .354, p < .05$).

Hypotheses 6a-e stated that WFC (i.e., WIFC, FIWC) was negatively related to job satisfaction facets (i.e., work, pay, promotion, supervision, coworker). We found that only WIFC was negatively related to job satisfaction-supervision (H6d: $\beta = -1.908, p < .05$) and coworkers (H6e: $\beta = -1.200, p < .05$). There was not a significant relationship for WIFC or FIWC and work, pay, and promotion. In addition, FIWC was not negatively related to supervision and coworker. Therefore, there is no support for hypotheses 6a, 6b, 6c, and partial support for 6d and 6e.

Further examination demonstrated that some of the findings were similar to the total sample and some were not. Consistent with the total sample, WIFC (Blacks, $\beta = -.043, ns$; Whites, $\beta = .014, ns$) and FIWC (Blacks, $\beta = -.032, ns$; Whites, $\beta = .011, ns$) were not significant to job satisfaction-work for both groups. In addition, FIWC was not significantly related to job satisfaction-pay (Blacks, $\beta = -.076, ns$; Whites, $\beta = .397, ns$), and WIFC was significantly related to job satisfaction-supervision for both groups (Blacks, $\beta = -.223, p < .05$; Whites, $\beta = -2.169, p < .05$). Also, for the Black group, WIFC was not significantly related to job satisfaction-pay ($\beta = -.008, ns$) and job satisfaction-promotion ($\beta = -.023, ns$). For Whites, FIWC was not related to job satisfaction-supervision ($\beta = .705, ns$) and job satisfaction-coworkers ($\beta = .869, ns$), and WIFC was negatively related to job satisfaction-coworkers ($\beta = -2.472, p < .05$). Contradictory to the total sample, both groups had a significant relationship between FIWC and job satisfaction-promotion (Blacks, $\beta = .197, p < .10$, moderate; Whites, $\beta = .652, p < .05$). An interesting note is that Blacks and Whites feel that the more their family interferes with work, the more they are satisfied with their job promotion. For the White group, WIFC was significantly

TABLE 4. UNSTANDARDIZED VALUES FOR THE WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT MEASUREMENT MODEL

Parameter	Path Coefficient	Hypothesis
<u>WIFC</u>		
Role Conflict	.141(1.942)*	H1a
Role Ambiguity	.777(6.918)**	H1b
Role Overload	-.562(-4.903)**	H1c
FIWC	.136(1.181)	H4
<u>FIWC</u>		
Role Conflict	.822(0.923)	H1a
Role Ambiguity	.387(0.927)	H1b
Role Overload	.982(0.852)	H1c
<u>Job Satisfaction-Work</u>		
WIFC	.199(1.381)	H6a
FIWC	.009(0.100)	H6a
<u>Job Satisfaction-Pay</u>		
WIFC	-.288(-0.677)	H6b
FIWC	-.858(-.721)	H6b
<u>Job Satisfaction-Promotion</u>		
WIFC	2.044(.576)	H6c
FIWC	-6.930(-.508)	H6c
<u>Job Satisfaction-Supervision</u>		
WIFC	-1.908(-5.792)**	H6d
FIWC	.310(1.521)	H6d
<u>Job Satisfaction-Coworkers</u>		
WIFC	-1.200(-5.887)**	H6e
FIWC	.171(1.277)	H6e

Note. The endogenous or dependent variables in the model are underlined; the exogenous variables are listed underneath. The t-values are in parentheses directly after the path coefficients.

$n = 276$ (175 Blacks and 101 Whites).

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$.

related to job satisfaction-pay ($\beta = -.553$, $p < .05$) and job satisfaction-promotion ($\beta = -.604$, $p < .05$). FIWC was significantly related to job satisfaction-supervision ($\beta = -.646$, $p < .10$,

moderate) and job satisfaction-coworkers ($\beta = -.288, p < .05$) for Blacks. In addition, Blacks did not have a significant relationship between WIFC and job satisfaction-coworkers ($\beta = .053, ns$).

Chi-Square Difference Tests for the Moderator Effects of Race

Consistent with Brown and Rana (2005), the Chi-square difference test was used to assess differences between the Black and White groups. As shown in Table 3, the Chi-square values and degrees of freedom for the baseline model are 30.461 with 36 degrees of freedom. We constrained the focal paths listed in Table 5 to be equal across the Black and White groups. The Chi-square value with one degree of freedom must equal at least 3.84 to be statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level; in addition, one degree of freedom Chi-square values greater than or equal to 2.706 are significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Thus, this change in Chi-square value indicates a group difference. Only those Chi-square value differences in Table 5 that achieve these minimum values indicate a moderator effect for racioethnic differences in our model.

Results of the Moderator Effects of Race

Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c stated that differences exist between Blacks and Whites in the relationship between role stress and WIFC. Differences were not observed between role stress and WIFC (role conflict, $\Delta\chi^2 = .069, ns$; role ambiguity, $\Delta\chi^2 = .049, ns$; role overload, $\Delta\chi^2 = 2.029, ns$). Thus, no support was found for hypotheses 2a, 2b, or 2c. In addition, with respect to hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c, differences in race were examined between role stress and FIWC. Only role overload out of the three role stressors had a significant difference between Blacks and Whites ($\Delta\chi^2 = 4.749, p < .05$). A difference between Blacks and Whites was not observed among the relationships of role conflict, role ambiguity, and FIWC. There was only support for hypothesis 3c. No support was found for hypotheses 3a and 3b. Further, when investigating whether a difference exists between Blacks and Whites between the FIWC–WIFC relationship (hypothesis 5), there was no support found ($\beta = .354, ns$).

Hypotheses 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, and 7e stated that differences exist in race in the relationship between WIFC and job satisfaction facets. Differences were not observed only between WIFC and job satisfaction-work (H7a: $\Delta\chi^2 = .299, n.s.$). A difference did exist between Blacks and Whites in the remainder of the WIFC–job satisfaction facets relationships (H7b – pay: $\Delta\chi^2 = 7.109, p < .05$; H7c – promotion: $\Delta\chi^2 = 5.739, p < .05$; H7d – supervision: $\Delta\chi^2 = 15.039, p < .05$; H7e – coworkers: $\Delta\chi^2 = 44.719, p < .05$). The White group had a significantly stronger path from WIFC to the pay, promotion, supervision, and coworkers facets of job satisfaction (see Table 5). Thus, no support was found for hypothesis 7a, but support was found for hypotheses 7b, 7c, 7d, 7e.

In addition, with respect to hypotheses 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d, and 8e, differences in race were examined between FIWC and job satisfaction facets. Only three of the five job satisfaction facets (pay, $\Delta\chi^2 = 3.009, p < .10$, moderate support; supervision, $\Delta\chi^2 = 5.779, p < .05$; coworkers, $\Delta\chi^2 = 5.329, p < .05$) had a significant difference between Blacks and Whites. A difference between

**TABLE 5. UNSTANDARDIZED VALUES FOR THE MODERATION OF
RACIOETHNICITY FOR THE WORK–FAMILY CONFLICT MEASUREMENT
MODEL**

Parameter	Path Coefficient (Blacks)	Path Coefficient (Whites)	Hypothesis	χ^2 Difference Test($\Delta\chi^2$)
<u>WIFC</u>				
Role Conflict	.208(1.477)	.183(2.173)**	H2a	.069
Role Ambiguity	-.062(-0.306)	-.012(-0.175)	H2b	.049
Role Overload	.663(6.207)**	.938(5.472)**	H2c	2.029
FIWC	.611(4.459)**	.354(2.019)**	H5	1.229
<u>FIWC</u>				
Role Conflict	.112(1.120)	.266(2.644)**	H3a	0.859
Role Ambiguity	.224(1.559)	.287(2.165)**	H3b	.049
Role Overload	.294(3.444)**	-.011(-0.102)	H3c	4.749**
<u>Job Satisfaction-Work</u>				
WIFC	-.043(-0.687)	.014(0.124)	H7a	.299
FIWC	-.032(-0.212)	.011(0.084)	H8a	.029
<u>Job Satisfaction-Pay</u>				
WIFC	-.008(-0.158)	-.553(-2.745)**	H7b	7.109**
FIWC	-.076(-0.822)	.397(1.545)	H8b	3.009*
<u>Job Satisfaction-Promotion</u>				
WIFC	-.023(-0.4277)	-.604(-2.756)**	H7c	5.739**
FIWC	.197(1.828)*	.652(2.288)**	H8c	2.279
<u>Job Satisfaction-Supervision</u>				
WIFC	-.223(-2.639)**	-2.169(-2.506)**	H7d	15.039**
FIWC	-.646(1.768)*	.705(1.340)	H8d	5.779**
<u>Job Satisfaction-Coworkers</u>				
WIFC	.053(1.041)	-2.472(-2.623)**	H7e	44.719**
FIWC	-.288(-3.185)**	.869(1.578)	H8e	5.329**

Note. The endogenous or dependent variables in the model are underlined; the exogenous variables are listed underneath. The t-values are in parentheses directly after the path coefficients.

$n = 276$ (175 Blacks and 101 Whites).

* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$.

Blacks and Whites was not observed among the relationships of FIWC, work, and promotion. Whites reported stronger relationships between the paths from FIWC to the pay, supervision, and coworkers facets of job satisfaction in our model (see Table 5). There was support for hypotheses 8b, 8d, and 8e, while neither hypothesis 8a nor 8c were supported. Furthermore, all of the group differences except for one (i.e., role overload to FIWC) indicated that respondents in the White group had significantly stronger path coefficients when compared to the Black group.

In structural equation modeling, the squared multiple correlations (SMCs) are equivalent to the R-squared terms in a regression model. The endogenous variables were WIFC, FIWC, job satisfaction-work, -pay, -promotion, -supervision, and -coworker. For the Black group, the SMCs for these variables were 35.23%, 9.36%, 8.73%, 2.24%, 6.45%, 7.05%, and 21.52%, respectively. For Whites, the SMCs were 93.16%, 20.13%, 17.82%, 34.51%, 20.29%, 32.82%, and 78.11%, respectively. It is interesting to note that a closer inspection of the total variance indicated that overall the White group structural equation model explained more variance than the respondents in the Black group model when comparing the squared multiple correlations of the endogenous variables: FIWC, WIFC, and job satisfaction facets.

DISCUSSION

This study underscores the importance of subgroup analysis when evaluating nomological networks and is consistent with prior organizational behavior research (Brown et al., 2009). Specifically, the inter-correlations among the research variables in our sample differed from previous findings in that Boles et al. (2001) found that WIFC was significantly related to all facets of job satisfaction except for the satisfaction-coworker dimension. In contrast, the Black group's WIFC was only significantly related to job satisfaction-supervision, and for the White group, WIFC was significantly related to the supervision and coworker facets of job satisfaction. Prior research studies also found that FIWC was significantly related to all facets of job satisfaction except for the satisfaction-promotion dimension (Boles et al., 2003). In this study though, we found that FIWC was only significantly related to the job satisfaction-coworker dimension in the Black group, and for Whites, FIWC was not significantly related to any of the job satisfaction facets. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 and consistent with the literature (Beutell & Wittig-Berman, 1999; Carlson & Kacmar, 2000) for both groups, FIWC and WIFC were directly related in our model.

Consistent with prior research, role conflict was significantly related to WIFC (Carlson & Kacmar, 2000). However, we also found role overload was inversely related and role ambiguity was positively related to WIFC. Contradictory to Carlson and Kacmar (2000), we did not report a significant relationship among role conflict, role ambiguity, and FIWC. Also inconsistent with prior research, we did not find a significant relationship between FIWC and WIFC (Boyar et al., 2003; Frone et al., 1992). Out of all the WIFC-job satisfaction facets relationships, in our study only WIFC and job satisfaction-supervision were significantly related (Boles et al., 2003).

When subjected to a Chi-square difference test (see Table 5), the path from role conflict to FIWC was statistically significant, which indicated an interaction for the moderator effects of race. In addition, the path from FIWC to job satisfaction-supervision also had a significant Chi-square

difference test, indicating the moderator effects of race. The path from WIFC to job satisfaction-coworker also produced a significant Chi-square difference test.

Nearly fifteen years after the Frone et al. (1992) study that found no racial differences between Blacks and Whites, our findings do not support their initial results. Racioethnic differences may in fact exist, and further research should be conducted to determine its generalizability, especially among other minority groups. Differences between Blacks and Whites were observed among the following relationships: role overload-FIWC, WIFC-job satisfaction-pay, FIWC-job satisfaction-pay, WIFC-job satisfaction-promotion, WIFC-job satisfaction-supervision, FIWC-job satisfaction-supervision, WIFC-job satisfaction-coworkers, and FIWC-job satisfaction-coworkers.

CONCLUSION

Using structural equation modeling and a robust sample of Blacks and Whites, the current research investigated the relationship between role stress (role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload), work-family conflict, and the facets of job satisfaction. Instead of a global measure of job satisfaction, this research employed the five facets of job satisfaction. Our findings highlight the need for sub-sample analysis in this area. Divergent findings were observed for Blacks and Whites in this study. These findings are tentative, and we encourage replication by other scholars.

Our findings contribute to the existing body of knowledge because this study provides additional evidence and importance of examining the facets of job satisfaction, which provides more sensitivity in analysis at the individual level. Indeed, using a global measure of job satisfaction may in fact obscure employee individual differences, which may adversely affect the effectiveness of managers. Along the employee satisfaction-dissatisfaction continuum, it may be that not all employees value each facet of job satisfaction equally. Another contribution of the current research is that we used a robust sample of Blacks and discovered that subgroup analysis may yield differential findings across this nomological network. Further, analyzing diverse samples may provide additional insight into employee behavior for human resource practitioners.

Findings from this study have several important practical implications. First, management should consider the individual's home responsibilities whenever possible because the willingness to be flexible or negotiate assignments can be viewed as a form of organizational support, which has been linked with job satisfaction (Babin & Boles, 1996). However, managers should exercise caution when providing organizational support in order to avoid overloading employees who may not have obvious conflicts between work and family. Indeed, a single employee may still have important personal obligations to friends and family members. Thus, managers should maintain flexibility while scheduling and should never expect single individuals or those who do not have children to bear the burden of unpleasant assignments. Management should consider the changing racial makeup of the workforce when making program and benefits decisions, as the desires of the workforce may be as diverse as the workforce itself.

Furthermore, the current economic conditions introduce implications on FIWC and WIFC that may not have been relevant before. According to the *U.S. Census Bureau* (2009), the current

unemployment rate is approaching double digits, which is the highest in decades. A key economic stress is job loss. Stress caused by the fear of losing one's job affects one's well being. As a result, some individuals are working longer hours to make up for laid off workers; still others are working harder to prove their value to their employer. Presumably, working more hours will lead to increased WIFC as well as FIWC. While the overall unemployment rate is approaching double digits, the rate is significantly higher for the minority population. As such, there may be increased instances of this working harder within those populations of people, consequently leading to increased WIFC and FIWC.

Limitations

As is true of most empirical research, the current research has some limitations. First, the cross-sectional design of the study does not allow for causal inferences. Another limitation of the study was that all data were collected via self-report measures, which may lead to the problem of common method bias and inflated predictive relationships. Finally, our conceptualization of the Black and White's role conflict construct yielded a Cronbach's alpha of 0.597 and 0.554, respectively, and the role ambiguity construct internal reliability for Blacks ($\alpha = .555$) was below the 0.70 level of acceptability. Therefore, conclusions drawn regarding the role conflict construct should be interpreted with caution until further replication of our findings.

Suggestions for Future Research

A future area of inquiry would be to compare the results of a structural equation model that uses a global measure of job satisfaction directly with another model using the facets. In addition, studies are needed that compare and contrast robust samples of all minority group members in this area of research. Another interesting research avenue would be to utilize different constructs for measuring work and family role stress in order to determine which scale has better psychometric properties. We believe that future studies should also examine gender differences in minority groups. Further, longitudinal designs are needed in this area to examine the behavior of these constructs and whether they wax or wane over time. Finally, exploring these constructs across racioethnic groups may be of some value as well, especially when using a multi-sample structural equation modeling framework.

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GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

In the international business and international relations literature, the prevailing sentiments regarding the role of the hegemony and global leadership appear unclear. The paper addresses the differences between global domination (hegemony) and leadership in the era of globalization. A framework is provided to differentiate between a hegemonic power and global leader. Furthermore, the paper suggests that in today's world there is a need for responsible global leadership to stabilize the world economy and enhance the quality of life for the world community. Implications for MNCs are provided.

INTRODUCTION

The journey of mankind, over the last few decades, has been full of contradictions: aspirations for peace and tragic wars; astonishing prosperity and widespread misery and poverty. Taken collectively, these contradictions, along with many others, reflect, to a large degree, an absence of visionary global leadership. In modern history, global leadership has been a complex but vital necessity for securing world stability and development. Columbus's voyages of 1492 marked the beginning of the ascendancy of European power. Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain were the dominant powers on the world stage in the 16th century. Their rise and decline was an epoch in world history that could shed light on the use and abuse of power in pursuing national goals to the detriment of other nations' interests. The industrial revolution, which began in the last quarter of the 18th century, became the hallmark of western civilization and since that time, modern technology has emerged as the vital factor for enhancing one's position of power in world affairs. England, with its new economic clout and navy power in the 19th century, came to play a decisive role in world events for many years. The birth of the Soviet Union in 1917, and the rise of the U.S. as a world economic and military power after the Second World War, marked the emergence of a global tension between these existing world superpowers. Their ideological conflicts and their domination in various parts of the world polarized countries into capitalist and socialist camps. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent "self-resignation" of Russia as a superpower has left the U.S. as the sole global power for the immediate future. The end of the Cold War is considered by many international relations experts as a blessed turning point in the history of humanity that coincides with the era of globalization. In fact, for a few years, there was optimism that the world was on the verge of peaceful transformation and prosperity. This optimism appears, however, to have been premature. Small-scale conflicts, invasion of sovereign countries by the leading global powers, regional instability, and economic and financial crises are a reminder that the world's problems are serious and that they require thoughtful leadership.

Critics argue that the abatement of the Cold War initiated the beginning of a new world system, a system that is characterized by at least three aspects. First, the plights and tragedies of many people in the developing world are tolerated in spite of widespread publicity. The seriousness of starvation, civil strife, foreign interventions and wars, for example, in Rwanda, Colombia, Angola, the Sudan, and the Congo have been given inadequate attention by the leading powers. Second, the unipolar world has become mostly hierarchical. The U.S. is the supreme power and other economically powerful countries are reduced to client-state status (e.g., Canada, Germany, Japan, and England) though the client-states have some degree of freedom in pursuing their national interests internationally. Third, nationalism and strong nationalist sentiments have become the driving force behind the supreme power's foreign policy. Yet, the supreme power denounces the same tendencies in other nations as manifestations of extremism and dangerous behavior. For example, U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright (1998) asserted that "if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future" (Para. 35).

This paper is designed to address the issue of world leadership in the era of globalization. It differentiates between global domination or hegemony and leadership. The authors hold that global change and aspirations accentuate the need for global leadership rather than hegemony. In the globalization era, the world's leaders should have a coherent vision based on peace, justice, and prosperity; display an unwavering commitment to principles of democracy and self determination for people across the globe, and demonstrate a commitment to equity and the quality of human life. First, many business leaders and corporations are actively engaged in defending human rights (e.g., William Clay Ford of Ford Motor Company, Dominic Tarantino of Price Waterhouse). In addition, emerging global executives play leading roles in building global consensus. These new actors find that it is not only a matter of principle, but good business practice to denounce violations of human rights and abuses of power. Second, because of the information technology revolution, powerful nations can no longer dictate events in most parts of the world. Events could be influenced by powerful actors, but it would be difficult to control them (e.g., the expulsion of the U.S. from the United Nations Human Rights Commission in May 2001). Third, people in the age of globalization have less tolerance for abuse than previously. Many people across the globe have experienced a taste of freedom which empowers them to denounce brutality and abuse. Fourth, it is impossible for a single power to shoulder alone responsibility for effectively addressing problems in a highly interdependent world. In this type of world, resorting to forceful suppression is more likely to lead to friction and resentment. As Gray (2006) argues, the hegemony "of the early twenty-first century depended upon a tissue of intangibles that was threatened, rather than invigorated, by the naked use of power.... We are moving into a world in which peace will depend on concerted action by several great powers" (para. 39). Lastly, non-government organizations (NGOs) have broadened their worldwide activities and have been inspired to assume the role of the guardians of principled conduct. Their active campaigns and well-organized information networks may deter some powerful nations from continuing historical patterns of abuse and misuse of their resources (e.g., Amnesty International, Green Peace).

NECESSITY FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Modelski (1987) argues that the global system needs leadership for three reasons: because all political systems have it; because it performs a set of basic functions at the global level; and because the role has been successfully practiced in the modern world for several centuries. Some of these reasons are not quite accurate; leadership is needed, not because all political systems have it, and certainly not because it has been successfully practiced, but simply because political systems differ in their forms and natures. There are democratic and autocratic systems, and others that are in transition. Furthermore, the existence of any system does not ensure the existence of leadership. Leadership requires specific qualities and is a multidimensional socio-political process. Responsible leadership fosters diversity and stimulates creativity in political, business, and social conduct. Dictatorship suppresses both. In addition, the experience of past centuries evidences, at best, a consistent imposition of hegemony rather than leadership.

Modelski gave Portugal and England as examples of past global leaders. Both, however, were hegemonic powers. For example, the memory of the colonization and exploitation of the African, Asian, and Latin American peoples by Western nations invokes bitter feelings and outcries among these people. The arbitrary rules and decisions that were made by the colonial powers tragically paralyzed many of the colonized nations politically, socially, and economically. In the case of Africa, Koopman (1994) indicates that Western powers thought that there was “nothing human ... worthy of respect on the African Continent.” Therefore, “colonialists proceeded with the mass violation of human rights by destroying dignity” (Koopman, 1994, p. 64). This practice can be termed anything but leadership.

Modelski, nevertheless, underscores the functional roles of global leadership (e.g., agenda formation, mobilization, decision-making, administration, and innovation). These are essential functions. Performing them successfully differentiates leadership from hegemony. For instance, Modelski suggests that Portugal’s pioneering oceanic navigation, and Britain’s launching the Industrial Revolution evidenced leadership. However, these examples do not mean that Portugal and Britain made conscious decisions to perform global leadership functions. More likely, these activities were performed to facilitate the growth of domestic industry and to promote the national political agenda. Responsible global leadership must articulate vision, strengthen the collective behavior, and shoulder responsibility morally and financially to sustain common goods. The functions of global leadership must focus, among others, on providing global public goods to the world community. Traditionally, public goods have been debated in the context of the nation-state. Issues of defense, law and order, stability of national income, roads, and prevention of environmental decay are on the top of the list of public goods. The consumption of public goods by an individual or any entity is not subtracted from the consumption of others. Governments, rather than private corporations, have been the main providers of public goods. The interdependence and integration of the world economy accentuates the need for providing and maintaining global public goods as an important ingredient in the discourse on globalization and global leadership. This is because sustaining global public goods on a worldwide scale facilitates and enhances global economic stability and integration.

The list of global public goods, however, is more complex and certainly more controversial than that at the national level. The majority of today’s public goods have both domestic and global

implications. For example, prevention of crime, drug trafficking, child labor, pollution, the minimization of inequality, and AIDS threats have far reaching implications for world economy and stability. In fact, in the era of globalization, inequality becomes one of the most dividing issues threatening world economic stability. It is related to five major global public goods: international economic stability, international political stability, international environment, international humanitarian assistance, and knowledge (see Stiglitz, 1998 for detail). Indeed, these issues have both national and international impacts. Dealing with these issues effectively and on a timely basis attests to the existence or absence of global leadership. In this paper issues related to international economic stability and international security are given priority as the main global public goods. This is because without stable world economic and political environments, maximization of production and distribution of global public goods will be far from reality. In a global environment where economic stability is the norm rather than exception, donors are more willing to lend their resources and volunteer their time.

Global leadership, by definition, facilitates and enhances world economic stability and international security. It assumes certain functions that focus primarily on sustaining global order, reducing tension, and maintaining structural arrangements and mechanisms necessary for productive international relations. Kindleberger (1981) argues that for the world economy to be stable, it needs a stabilizer; a country that would provide a market for distress goods, a steady flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when there is a monetary crisis. He suggests that Britain played this role during the nineteenth century, while the U.S. assumed it from 1945 to 1968. Mitchell (1992), on the other hand, asserts that the U.S. provides the needed international political and security functions. He argues that in terms of Gross National Product (GNP), military expenditure, and manufacturing production, the U.S. has been the dominant power and thereby it is qualified to be the world hegemonic power. For Gray (1997) global leadership must perform three hegemonic tasks: military, economic, and financial. These tasks are necessary for furnishing global public goods and maintaining global domination.

HEGEMONIC POWER AND LEADERSHIP

One of the arguments that is often mentioned in the debate on world leadership is that “leadership” eventually degenerates into exploitation and domination (see Calleo, 1987; Kindleberger, 1981). Furthermore, the dynamic international economic and political balance of power, and the historical evolution of world community lead to the decay of the hegemonic nation (See Calleo, 1987; Modelski, 1987). The issue is whether or not hegemony and leadership are one and the same. In fact, both concepts have different implications for national, regional, and international affairs. While it is true that the hegemony state may engage, under certain circumstances, in some functions of leadership, nevertheless these are displayed selectively and as deemed necessary to maximize the national interests of the hegemonic state (e.g., Britain in the nineteenth-century provided the gold standard, and stable monetary policy; the Soviet Union sustained a stable income for its satellites for several decades). Once their preeminence began to erode, signs of instability floated to the surface (e.g., the rising conflicts and disintegration in the Arab World as the power of Britain and France weakened after the Second World War; instability and conflict among many countries that were part of the Soviet Union after the collapse of the latter).

The fact that power and influence are often used interchangeably in the literature induces researchers to overlook differences between hegemony and leadership in world affairs. Therefore, global leadership is viewed in terms of the power to dictate or control world agenda (Gray, 1997; Kagan, 1998; McGrew, 1992; Mengisteab, 1996; Mitchell, 1992; Talbott, 1998).

Political and world events over the last few centuries demonstrate that the forceful exercise of power is the essence of hegemony. Even liberal minded individuals within the hegemonic nation are not shy in espousing a hegemonic approach to world affairs. For example, Strobe Talbott, then the US Deputy Secretary of State, declared that, while taking into account the “foreign sensitivities to American assertiveness,” we must be proud of being hegemony. Indeed, power may “seem a heavy-handed technique for achieving desired ends” (Hollander, 1978, p.84).

Influence, on the other hand, is essentially persuasion; inducement founded on an open dialogue and objective reasoning. Figure 1 depicts the uses of power and influence by hegemonic power and global leadership. The Figure represents a continuum in which the degree and nature of responsibility is exercised by a powerful entity on the global stage. On the left, the hegemonic entity relies heavily on the use of coercive power and thereby dominates the global scene and is not accountable to others. On the right, the global power employs persuasion in influencing others and thus is inclined toward shared responsibility and benefits. In between, there are various forms of global power which can impede or secure the availability of public goods. Ideally, the closer such powers get to the right the higher the probability for optimal distribution of public goods.




FIGURE 1. POWER BASE AND RESPONSIBILITY ORIENTATIONS UNDER THE HEGEMONY AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

An article in *Time* (1996) suggests that power “gets its way,” while influence “makes its way” (25 most influential Americans). This distinction underscores a profound difference in orientations between hegemony and leadership. First, influence is viewed as “a vision” that inspires people or nations to discard their doubts, “an ability to connect with people” across the globe, and to comprehend the way they look at and react to events. Second, yesterday’s dominant powers such as Rome, Spain, Great Britain and the contemporary dominant power, the U.S., relied and rely on a single view of their own leaders and the elite. These leaders may have admirably served their respective countries. Nevertheless, their view was shaped by domestic political considerations, and did not seriously take into consideration the desires and aspirations of people living in other parts of the world. A political elite in a hegemonic nation, mainly answers to local constituencies and rarely pursues a vision that takes into account the wishes and goals of other nations. It can be argued that powerful nations who lack vision and resort to coercion in their relations are not influential, as they cannot attract a following and build the confidence and trust necessary for stability and global growth. Furthermore, power, if used unilaterally, creates friction, conflict, and resentment. In the information age, and in an integrated world economy, relying merely on power will impair the quest for a civilized global society. Likewise, in a highly interdependent world, global decisions must reflect, in general terms, the collective aspirations of world citizens, not just those of the G-7 elite. Global actions have a far-reaching impact, and the need to avoid global backlash demands that inclusion, rather than exclusion, be the mode for international relations. Certainly, this will enhance global understanding and the ascent to a civilized global society. In fact, in an interdependent and reasonably integrated world, leadership effectiveness is measured, as Chester Barnard argued,

solely by “the accomplishment of the recognized objectives of cooperative action” (Barnard cited in Hollander, 1978, p. 111). This means that the chief task of global leadership is to secure the recognized goals with the greatest possible consideration for the nations comprising the world community (Hollander, 1978). The Communist leaders in the former Soviet Union constantly presented the Soviet Union as the shining example of co-existence and economic prosperity. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, uncovered the fact that many of its former Muslim Asian states, among others, had experienced cultural alienation and economic stagnation. Likewise, the British political and military domination over the rest of the world was seen by the British elites, too, as a means “of spreading growth and enlightenment throughout the globe” (Calleo, 1987, p. 145). In both cases, the hegemonic power lacked an adequate sense of history and insight with which to probe the future and act accordingly.

Viewing leadership as a hegemonic function, however, overlooks the essence and meaning of leadership. More importantly, it means that neither adequate infrastructure nor appropriate climate is available for providing and furnishing global public goods. In spirit and in practice, hegemonic power forces its will on others. The latter are considered insignificant and their wishes and interests are marginalized, if not, discredited. Experience clearly indicates that hegemony has a tendency to degenerate into domination and exploitation, and eventually disregards universally held moral standards. This point was articulated by Mengisteab (1996). In the context of African experience, he states (p. 152):

The U.S.-led camp of the capitalist countries essentially applied the carrot and the stick to attract and keep African countries in its sphere of influence. It provided some incentives in the form of economic and military aid to the countries under its influence. The price for siding with the U.S. camp was maintaining the socioeconomic structures left behind by the colonial system. The interests and ideological orientation of this camp, by and large, did not allow fundamental changes in the existing social order.

Therefore, hegemony is a process by which the powerful actor dictates its wishes to the less powerful parties through coercion, seduction, manipulation, and inducement. It should be noted that this concept of hegemony is different from the Gramscian understanding. Hegemony as theorized by Gramsci is not imposed. Rather it is achieved through persuasion and the consent of the subordinate groups (Buttigieg, 2005; Levy & Newell, 2002). However, hegemony as explained in this paper, is a model that is inherently abusive and is incapable of handling global affairs in the service of mankind.

Under a leadership situation, the aim is not to remake the world in the image of one nation; diversity within and between nations must be nurtured. In viewing global leadership as a socio-political process, the importance of learning, understanding and creative imagination is underscored as the hallmark of the process. That is, global leaders must have a sense of history and imaginatively probe the reasons for setbacks, challenges, and triumphs across centuries of humanity’s collective journey. More significantly, leaders must creatively define world reality and identify options for reaching an ideal future.

Table 1 highlights the most common differences between global leadership and hegemony. Leadership is viewed as the capacity to influence and inspire others through an effective, two-

way, interactive process to reach a common understanding of principles, norms and mutual goals relative to world affairs. The objective is to sustain global growth and cooperation.

TABLE 1. CONTRASTING GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND HEGEMONY

Dimension	World Hegemony	Global Leadership
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base of Power ▪ Goal ▪ Means for Achieving Goals ▪ Vision ▪ Underlying Motives ▪ Actors ▪ Frame of Reference ▪ Decision Style ▪ Orientations ▪ Faith in Capabilities and Future ▪ Tolerance for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military, financial, and economic resources ▪ Military, economic, and cultural domination ▪ Mostly coercion, force, and manipulation ▪ Creation of a world according to its own image ▪ Nationalistic superiority ▪ A few dominate nations ▪ National experience ▪ Erratic and authoritarian ▪ Generally, conflict oriented and secretive in nature; less inclined to play by the global rules ▪ Pessimistic and no confidence in followers' ability to contribute meaningfully to world affairs. Obsession with obtrusive domination and blindness to changing world reality lead to decay ▪ Low tolerance and high fear of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Knowledge and reference ▪ Devising collective principles to focus on world affairs, peace, and economic prosperity; offers directions for change ▪ Dialogue and negotiation via well structured multilateral institutions ▪ Appreciation of diversity within the framework of the world community ▪ Collective understanding and the welfare of the world community. ▪ Leading nations, NGOs, global corporations and influential individuals ▪ A sense of history and the collective experience of the world community ▪ Systematic and participative ▪ Consensus building, transparency, and commitment to play by the agreed- upon rules ▪ Optimistic and strong faith in collective judgments. This leads to continuing renewal ▪ High tolerance

<p>uncertainty</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Procedures for Solving Conflicts ▪ Treatment of Followers ▪ Attitude toward Change ▪ Responsibility/Rights 	<p>uncertainty</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Arbitrary, secretive, and exclusive. ▪ Discriminatory in nature, preferences are determined by economic and cultural interests and domestic political priorities ▪ Maintains status quo and views change as a last resort. Change, however, is highly guarded; it is a destabilizing factor ▪ Subjectively releases responsibility but displays monopolistic claims on benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rule of law, openness, and inclusion ▪ Relatively non-discriminatory and influenced by the need to maintain consensus and coherence of the world community; commitment to shared goals ▪ Encourages change; a necessary means for understanding global trends and improving quality of life ▪ Shared responsibility and benefits
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It is possible to suggest that the primary differences between hegemony and leadership center around, at least, eight aspects. First, in a hegemonic environment, power takes the form of coercion while in leadership it is derived from consent. Indeed, hegemony undermines faith in the global institutions and obstructs the development of global peace.

Paul Wolfowitz (2002), the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, articulated the use of force to ensure obedience when he stated that Pax Americana entailed “demonstrating that your friends will be protected and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so” (Wolfowitz cited in Keller, 2002, para. 42). Second, hegemonic power does not tolerate deviation and seeks to maintain the status quo; change is viewed as a threat to national interests. Therefore, change is only reluctantly pursued. Former U.S. President Richard Nixon (1992) asserted that the U.S., for example, had vital interests in the Arab Gulf area and had to ensure the survival of the regimes there. He stated, “The United States has no choice but to respond with military force if necessary to turn back threats to these interests” (Nixon, 1992, p. 36). Leadership, on the other hand, creates an environment conducive to genuine change and peaceful coexistence.

Third, the hegemonic power is secretive about its schemes and tends to divide the world into several camps (e.g., allies, potential rivals, rogue states or enemies, and insignificant followers). In contrast, leadership engages in open dialogue to creatively manage events for the benefit of all involved. The underlying assumption is that “we cannot do great work unless everyone shares both in the work and in its results” (Collier, 1971, p. 21). Fourth, hegemonic power does not

believe that entitlements and obligations go hand in hand. Evidence shows that both in the past and the present history the hegemonic power releases its responsibility when there is a serious world problem. For example, for the past decade, “Bangladesh, Nigeria, Fiji, and Nepal have been doing U.N. peacekeeping that the U.S. wants done but doesn’t want to do by itself. These poor countries ... have been paying the salaries of the U.N. peacekeepers themselves, while waiting for years for the U.S. to pay its dues. So the world’s richest country has been taking interest-free loans from the world’s poorest, dollar-a-day economies” (Friedman, 2001, para. 7). In the case of leadership, international relations are “two-way matters and [those] rights are matched by obligations” (Collier, 1971, p. 17). Fifth, the hegemonic power attempts to project its image on a global scale. It pursues its national interests blindly. Normally, the hegemonic power disregards the desires and aspirations of other nations and views world events strictly in terms of exercising its power and control. The interdependence of the world economy and global connectivity, however, have stimulated hegemonic powers in recent decades to give attention to their public image. Hegemonic powers, for example, justify their actions by manipulating multilateral institutions to approve plans that are designed strictly by them.

In dealing with other nations and actors, the hegemonic power most likely provides them with an “either/or” situation. President George W. Bush in his state of the Union address in January 2002 made it clear that nations which do not agree with his foreign policy approach are on the enemy’s side. In contrast, in a state where there is leadership, there is “a two-way influence relationship aimed primarily at attending mutual goals.... Therefore, leadership is not just the job of the leader but also requires the cooperative efforts of others” (Hollander, 1978, p. 2). Unlike hegemonic power, global leaders treat followers as stakeholders, thereby allowing maximum involvement possible in managing world affairs. Though, it remains to be seen, President Obama (2009) gave the indication that, unlike his predecessor, he is more inclined to engage others in matters that have global implications, stating, “The nations of the world have a stake in one another. The United States is ready to join a global effort on behalf of new jobs and sustainable growth. Together, we can learn the lessons of this crisis, and forge a prosperity that is enduring and secure for the 21st century” (Obama, 2009, para. 19).

Sixth, hegemonic powers normally have a short-term vision of the world order and fail miserably in learning from the experience of former dominant powers. By contrast, leadership is more likely to have long-term goals and a deep understanding of history. Seven, the process (e.g., trade and military domination and expansion) that stimulates the rise of a hegemonic power and its preeminence leads to its decay and eventual disintegration (e.g. Britain, Spain, Portugal, etc.). Indeed, the evolution of a hegemonic power is a backward process where success leads to domination, exploitation, and eventual disintegration. In contrast, global leadership is a relational process that is sustained by creative imagination and continuing revitalization and renewal. Success, therefore, deepens openness and the propensity for inclusion. Eight, the dominant actor in a hegemonic environment is a powerful nation or a selection of nations; a centralized power. For example, in recent years, the U.S. has approached international challenges by “working with others when we can, alone when we must, using diplomacy where possible and force where necessary” (Clinton, 1996, para. 13). Under leadership, the actors are leading nations, global corporations, NGOs, etc. These actors are driven to achieve mutual goals through a relational process. That is, influence is diffused globally.

HEGEMONIC FAILURE

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the history of mankind has more often experienced hegemonic power rather than global leadership. Neither significant global understanding and peace nor a stable world economy has been realized in any noticeable period in recent history. In addition, the history of civilization proves that hegemonic powers are driven by their interests and these interests are pursued blindly or aggressively. The recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the hegemonic power is able to invade but fails miserably in maintaining order or peace.

Harries (2005) asserts that:

Today, after its [U.S.] deployment in Iraq, the world is much more aware of its limitations and less impressed: aware that while it has an enormous capacity to crush and destroy, its ability to control, to impose and maintain order is far less; that while its technology is superb, the human resources at its disposal for protracted occupation or multiple engagements is seriously limited and the equality of its civilian and military leadership questionable. (p. 26)

Even if we assume that, hegemonic powers could produce and efficiently make available global public goods, no strong evidence exists in recent history to prove that either international economic stability or international political stability has been achieved. The 1997 Asia financial crisis and resulting economic crises in other parts of the world (e.g., Argentina, Russia, Brazil, Turkey), and current financial and economic meltdown (2008-09) provide evidence that the hegemonic power (U.S.) has not been able to furnish world economic stability. In addition, UN documents reveal that not only is the gap between rich and poor nations widening, but also “there are more LDCs (least developed countries) now than there were 20 years ago” (see Anan, 2001, para. 20). Furthermore, CIA director, George J. Tenet (2001) asserts, for example, “Over the past 25 years, Middle Eastern economies have averaged only 2.8 percent GDP growth—far less than Asia and only slightly more than sub-Saharan Africa. The region has accounted for a steadily shrinking share of world GDP, trade and foreign direct investment since the mid-1970s, and real wages and labor productivity today are about the same as 30 years ago” (para. 47).

International political stability, too, is not something that looks bright or promising. As a global public good, international political stability should assume priority on the agenda of global leadership. This is because it is linked to world economic growth and prosperity and is the foundation upon which civilized behavior and civilized institutions are built. However, in a world that is dominated by competing hegemony jockeying for superiority or by a supreme hegemon, the state of international political affairs is anything but stable. Narrow national interests and greed impede hegemonic powers from understanding history and imaginatively addressing world crises. For example, in the early years of the twentieth century, Britain failed to adjust to or accommodate the other rising hegemony. Therefore, it vigorously attempted to convert its slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony that eventually led to its collapse, furthering world instability (Calleo, 1987).

The events in Bosnia and Croatia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone,

Colombia, Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, provide overwhelming evidence that international stability and security are far from a reality. These events coupled with potential nuclear conflicts create chronic crises. Hegemonic powers, therefore, will find it more and more difficult to manage conflicts in a satisfactory way. Every crisis requires that hegemonic powers have to divert important resources from the domestic to the international arena and vice versa (Both the chaos in Iraq and hurricane Katrina demonstrate that the hegemonic power has limited reach and resources). These resources would appear to be inadequate to meet the challenge of present and emerging conflicts. Therefore, these developments render strong support to the proposal that furnishing international political stability is a responsibility of leadership rather than hegemony.

Most international relations experts assert that hegemonic powers are doomed to failure. Layne (2004), for example, argues that hegemonic powers have a tendency to destabilize the world by antagonizing other nations. Samuel Berger (2000), Clinton's national security advisor, seemed to agree when he stated, "There may be no real threat to our power today. But if we use power in a way that antagonizes our friends and dishonors our commitments, we will lose our authority and our power will mean very little" (p. 39). Kissinger (2001) argues that resentment of hegemonic power is a fact of life and it is only a mere illusion to expect it to vanish. This is especially true, he argues, as American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has steadily turned into a series of proposals for adherence to an American agenda. He concluded that the international scene displays a strange mixture of respect for, and submission to, America's power.

The issue, however, is whether there is any mechanism to sustain this strange mixture of respect and resentment. Logically, it is doubtful. The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrates that both "respect" and "submission" are subject to eventual erosion. For example, both the American and Iraqi people have gradually shown an increasing anxiety over the course of events in Iraq. The international community, in general, has exhibited a loss of faith in the ability of the hegemonic power to establish peace and/or restore order and tranquility.

In the literature, three plausible alternatives for hegemonic power are often suggested. Falk and Strauss (2003) assert that promoting a world order that is democratic, equitable, and sustainable necessitates the establishment of a citizen-elected Global Parliamentary Assembly (GPA). This GPA would create a democratic core to the international system.

Paul Martin (2005), prime minister of Canada, argues that most of the political problems in the world are left without solutions. He suggests that there should be a result-oriented forum to promote the exchange of views and to focus on how political leadership is needed in order to move forward. He called this forum the leaders-20. Membership in this forum, he suggests, would be drawn initially from G-20 and could then decide how best to broaden their membership in more explicitly political directions. Martin sees the world as a collection of groups with shared interest and aspiration. In this world, the boundaries between countries are growing fainter and successful countries are those who work as closely with their friends around the world as they do with their neighbors next door.

Former U.S. national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004), acknowledges that there are differences between hegemony and leadership. He, however, thinks that there is a possibility for

transforming the current hegemonic power into a global leadership. He postulates that competing powers and rivalry in the world demand the formation of consensual leadership. To make his point clear, Brzezinski differentiates between two types of superpower: Superpower Plus and Superpower Minus. The former leads “an enduring and enlarging alliance of like-minded democracies in a comprehensive campaign against the conditions that precipitate turmoil” (Brzezinski, 2004, p. 216). Under the state of Superpower Minus, the hegemonic power is selfishly derived from its narrow national interest and thus tends to ignore global turmoil and the worldwide political awakening of mankind and its intensifying awareness of intolerable disparities of the human condition. Brzezinski considers consensual leadership, at this critical juncture, as the only practical solution to prevailing disorder.

GLOBAL LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Perhaps one of the most important realities of the twentieth century and the near future is the conspicuous absence of global leadership. Hegemonic powers have failed to transfer themselves into leaders and, consequently the providers of international political and economic stabilities. It is a matter of fact that these two global public goods, like other public goods, need a legitimate global provider. At the national level, governments through taxation and distribution provide most public goods. At the global level, and in the absence of global leadership, no agreed upon authority so far exists. Of course, creating a legitimate global provider requires collective action. Presently, this is obstructed by internal and external sovereignty considerations and by the slow adjustment of existing national and international institutions to changing global financial, economic, and technological conditions.

It is essential that the 21st century be led by a coalition of leading powers rather than a single power. This does, as Haas (2004) argues, need to effectively utilize existing governance efforts, rather than create new governance bodies and focusing on streamlining and improvement of performance and the establishment of workable multilateral alternatives. The coalition of leading powers should encompass “leader nations” and “surrogate leaders” (e.g., NGOs, global organizations). Currently, the latter are attacking global problems, but the approach has been largely ad hoc and random (Tarantino, 1998). To stimulate and stabilize the global economy, the leader nations must have a consensual vision and must be a catalyst for integration and collaboration by deepening and sharpening the art of global persuasion. The 21st century global leadership must focus on integrating all social and economic forces at the city, state, and regional levels and on a global basis.

To be a legitimate provider of global public goods, the leader nations must work closely with and stimulate surrogate global leaders such as NGOs, other global development and social agencies, regional and multi-cultural organizations, and global corporations. These surrogate leaders are capable of providing rich resources and talent necessary for facilitating global learning, understanding, and change. Unlike the State, these organizations have broader, if not, global constituencies, and are not driven by narrow national interests, and most likely, are not conflict driven. They have proven to be effective global forces in setting moral and ethical standards to minimize social suffering, while strengthening the foundation for cooperative utilization of existing resources. More importantly, surrogate global leaders, especially NGOs, perform crucial functions in sensitizing leader nations to critical issues pertaining to global public goods and in

mediating among governments to minimize sources of friction and misunderstanding. In fact, when a leading NGO, Amnesty International, launched its report, in May 2005, on the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo at the hands of a superpower, it not only made international headlines but inspired widespread condemnation and calls for reform in Washington.

Is it likely or even possible for a country with hegemonic power to gravitate toward or even adopt a position of global leadership? Domestic, nationalistic and psychological pressures generally prompt the elites of powerful nations to embark on hegemonic courses of action rather than committing to multi-lateral and inclusive global positions. While this has been the typical case historically, the ascendancy of economic globalization and the degree of global connectivity have intensified the search for global cooperation and placed universal considerations at the center of many governments' agendas.

In a state of world politics where there is only one uniquely positioned power with a few other powerful states in a sea of fragmented and less powerful nations and NGOs, there is a tendency for the dominant power to be hegemonic. The center of power will most likely be tempted to manipulate world events and mold existing rules and procedures to optimize its interests. Furthermore, such a country will likely overlook the spirit and meaning of consensus and instead rely on coercive seduction to line up support for its political and economic policies. Consequently, world political, military, and economic arrangements are structured in a way to facilitate and serve the interests of the dominant force.

In a situation where there are noticeable and multiple autonomous power centers in a sea of minor but conscientious actors, be they States or civic organizations, there is a reasonably high possibility for the emergence of a governance regime that resembles global leadership. In this state of affairs, horizontal or "relational" pluralism will permit the maximum use of cooperative efforts and an emergence of a framework for addressing concerns and grievances and anticipated problems. A conscientious and deliberate discourse on universally accepted norms and behavior and shared goals will not only ease internalization of these norms but also provide a mechanism for minimizing if not preventing possible tendencies for the misuse of power. It is under this system that civic organizations thrive and the rights of economically or militarily disadvantaged members are protected. Indeed, it is in this system that NGOs can play a significant role in balancing the power of states.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Certainly, in the not so distant future, the issue of whether or not a global leadership exists will be a matter of debate. The optimism that accompanied the abatement of the Cold War has degenerated rapidly and the fear of a possible global calamity appears to have taken root in some parts of the world. While 9/11 was a reminder of existing challenges in adequately co-opting diverse political and cultural groups and or in satisfactorily addressing serious grievousness, its aftermath has deepened suspicions and strengthened the primacy of force in solving political problems. These developments constitute a threat to a collective world order and to economic stability.

Although the emergence of European hegemonic powers, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was instrumental in shaping world order and facilitating international trade and the surfacing of charter corporations (e.g., Dutch West India, East India Co. etc.) and subsequently multinational corporations (MNCs), in today's world hegemonic powers may be problematic. Furthermore, global trade and the diversity in ownership and location of MNCs (e.g., from Japan and emerging markets, etc.) may not optimally thrive in a world dominated by competing hegemonic powers where nationalistic interests and jockeying for influence are the norms. This fact, along with others, offers certain implications for MNCs and policymakers in various parts of the world.

The persistence of economic and political instabilities represents a peril for MNCs and for the integration of the global economy. Under a hegemonic regime, MNCs are more likely to squander time and resources to monitor hegemonic and other powerful actors' strategic interests instead of focusing on anticipating customer needs and meeting the challenge of market competition. Corporations may operate in less than satisfactory market conditions and face serious challenges in forging alliances and allocating resources to cope with ever changing world events.

In fact, in this state of global instability, the pattern of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade is expected to follow the familiar trends. Most FDI and trade takes place in East Asia, the US, and Europe leaving most of the countries in Africa and south and west Asia outside the core of the global economy. Furthermore, MNCs will be prevented from allocating resources according to the best available opportunities. Most importantly, in a state of global political instability where the threat of war and violence are part of daily life, citizens are not expected to seek improvement or diligently invest resources to improve quality and productivity. In fact, in an environment of fear and violence, consumer welfare, health, and safety are experiencing deterioration. Consequently, there will be less spending and less than optimal involvement in economic activities. It is possible too that in the state of global domination, trust will give way to fear and suspicion. Thus, domination will become a source of conflict and uncertainty instead of an instrument for peace and stability. Under this condition, the world will not be safe for either consumers or multinationals. As this condition persists, the dominate power may intensify its use of force to ensure global submission thereby generating a new cycle of violence and instability. Subsequently, global resources and talents will be squandered.

History clearly demonstrates that the evolution of global leadership is not the ultimate result of a natural transformation from a hegemonic position. Rather, global leadership is subject to evolutionary factors in global economy and international affairs. These forces are strengthened by a rapid global economic integration and connectivity of the world community, a deep-rooted worldwide desire for efficient production and distribution of global public goods, and by the rising influence of global NGOs. Therefore, global leadership is needed primarily to resolve inconsistencies between agreed upon principles (e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and realities in international affairs. More likely global leadership offers a better hope for world economic stability and growth and eventually strengthens the psychological foundation that the rights of the less powerful partners, especially developing countries, are protected.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS AND WAR: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE OR UNETHICAL

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ABSTRACT

Grunig (1993) claimed that the adoption of a symmetrical model of public relations (PR) would eliminate most ethical problems in international public relations. This paper examines that proposition, applying it to the public relations of warfare. Examples of public relations related to warfare in this paper show it is not likely that a symmetrical model would be adopted because the purpose of public relations in time of war is to persuade and restrict the flow of information. The history of public relations and warfare is marked by deception and propaganda. It is likely that these patterns will continue into the future.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In practice, most public relations professionals emphasize the importance of social responsibility and ethics. The relationship between organizations and publics mandates social responsibility, because "an organization's actions have consequences for publics and they in turn affect the organization." Thus, in public relations theory, according to Grunig (1993), "public relations and public responsibility become nearly synonymous terms: public relations is the practice of public responsibility" (p. 146). Nevertheless, many practitioners attempt to fool publics by concealing the consequences of bad organizational actions. However, over time these practices don't result in effective relationships nor benefit the organization (Grunig, 1993, p. 146). When practiced unethically, public relations can "manipulate and deceive," making "decent and rational, unemotional debate" on issues difficult (Grunig, 1993, p. 138).

Models of public relations

Grunig (1993) indicates that the quality of relationships (and ethics) depends on the model of public relations used. In describing the history of public relations in the United States, Grunig and Hunt (1984) identified four models practiced in public relations: press agency, public information, two-way asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical. In his discussion of international public relations, Grunig (1993) added a fifth model: public influence.

James Grunig originally identified two variables that distinguished the models of public relations: direction and purpose (Grunig & Grunig, 1992). Direction describes the extent to which the models use one-way or two-way communication. One-way communication is a monologue because it disseminates information. On the other hand, two-way communication is dialogic because it exchanges information between the sender and receiver. Purpose describes whether the model is asymmetrical or symmetrical. As implied by the names the practice of the asymmetrical model is imbalanced, irregular and incongruent while the symmetrical model is balanced, orderly, regular, and congruent. The imbalance occurs in asymmetrical public relations because its practice is one-sided, focusing on the purveyor of information rather than on all

parties in the communication. Because the asymmetrical model seeks to change the audience and leaves the organization unchanged, it is imbalanced. Symmetrical communication is balanced, adjusting the relationship between the audience and the public.

Later Grunig added a third and fourth set of variables (Grunig, Grunig & Dozier, 2002). The third variable is the use of mediated or interpersonal forms of communication. The fourth is the extent to which the practice of public relations is ethical. Grunig discovered the third variable as he examined public relations as it is practiced internationally. He found that in other countries public relations practitioners used interpersonal relations to develop and extend their connections. When he applied this discovery to his four models, he realized that each form of public relations could be practiced either interpersonally or through the media. In many cases both interpersonal and mediated communications were combined. He also realized that ethics played a factor in all four models. While symmetrical communications are inherently ethical, the other three forms could also be practiced ethically, depending upon the rules followed by the practitioners.

The press agency model is a one-way, asymmetrical model that uses the media to persuade its audience. The approach uses favorable publicity in the news media to change the audiences' outlook of the client. Often the publicity is misleading and hype. When it is, it is unethical. In the 1800s, P.T. Barnum used press agency effectively as he fabricated stories about Jumbo the elephant, the midget Tom Thumb, and George Washington's 100-year-old nurse maid. Publicists commonly used press agency to promote celebrities in sports, movies, politics, and business.

The public information model of public relations, like the press agency model, uses one-way asymmetrical communication, mainly in the mass media, to persuade audiences of organizational viewpoints. Practitioners disseminate relatively objective information to the media through press packets, containing news releases, newsletters, brochures and other corporate data. At the beginning of the 20th century organizations hired journalists as public relations practitioners to counter charges of muckrakers (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). The practitioners prepared press "handouts" to explain business activities and inform the public of the good things associated with the organizations. The work of Ivy Lee, who practiced public relations in the early 1900s, typified the public information model. While press agency often uses propaganda and deception, the public information approach is generally honest and truthful (Grunig & Grunig, 1992). Characteristically, it is more ethical than the press agency model. Both models are one-way asymmetrical, neither using research nor strategic planning.

The two-way asymmetrical model is distinguished from press agency and public information because it uses research. Practitioners both seek information from and give information to their publics. It uses persuasion as the primary means of communicating to audiences. It uses either interpersonal or mediated communications and can be either ethical or unethical. While two-way asymmetrical public relations can be ethical, the persuasive goal of the model makes ethical practice more difficult. Edward Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, practiced this scientific approach in the period following World War I. He used the theories of propaganda, persuasion, and "engineering of consent" to manipulate audiences. "The secret of successful manipulation," according to Bernays, "was in understanding the motivations of people and in using research to identify the messages most likely to produce the attitudes and behaviors desired by an organization" (Bernays cited in Grunig and Grunig, 1992, p. 288).

Unlike the two-way asymmetrical model, the two-way symmetrical approach uses research “to facilitate understanding and communication” instead of finding messages that can motivate and persuade publics (Grunig and Grunig, 1992). The two-way asymmetrical model works well in the absence of conflict. On the other hand, the two-way symmetrical model, which is based on strategic planning, manages conflict by creating understanding between the organization and its publics. It bases public relations on negotiation and compromise. The model is symmetrical because both the organization and practitioner may change their behavior as a result of a communication program. Because the organization is prepared to change to meet audience expectations, its actions are almost always ethical. Both interpersonal and mediated communications may be used in this approach. Two-way symmetrical communication is one of the nine principles that identify “excellence” in public relations (Vercic, Grunig, & Grunig, 1996).

Grunig’s studies of international public relations have identified the four models in use in other countries as well as in the United States. In addition, his studies of international PR identified a fifth model, personal influence. Personal influence uses personal contacts and relationships to get special treatment for clients. Often the practitioners are former members of the media, government, or political groups. By using previous relationships or establishing friendships with key people in government, politics, activist groups, or the media, practitioners can get favorable policies or coverage for their clients. The model is most often asymmetrical and its practice may be unethical. When practiced ethically, however, it may be viewed as symmetrical because it uses interpersonal relations rather than personal influence (Grunig, 1993).

“Asymmetrical—and unethical—public relations seems to have been prevalent in international public relations throughout history, especially during times of conflict” (Grunig, 1993, p. 147). Propaganda, which is “one-sided, usually half-truthful communication designed to persuade public opinion,” is a characteristic of asymmetrical public relations as practiced during warfare and in international politics. The terms, “promoters, propagandists, and lobbyists,” fit the press agency, two-way asymmetrical and personal influence models of public relations, respectively (Grunig, 1993, p. 149).

Propaganda and Public Relations

Propaganda, according to Jowett and Heath (2004), “often blends seamlessly with legitimate public relations practices” (p. 656). Sproule (1997) defined propaganda as “the work of a large organization, nation, or group to win over the public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons” (p. 8). Jowett and O'Donnell (2006) focused on propaganda as a communication process when they stated: “Propaganda is the deliberate, systemic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (p. 7). Both public relations and propaganda, according to Jowett and Heath (2004) “stem from a common desire to affect the attitudes and perceptions held by people ... toward an infinite variety of subjects, in order to shift opinion and beliefs in a desired direction” (p. 652). Propaganda is viewed in negative terms because of its historical association with religion, warfare, and politics. Public relations is a legitimate activity that

"enhances the images and perceptions of a wide variety of institutions" (Jowett & Heath, 2004, p. 652).

However, Grunig (1993) admits that some of his models of public relations (press agency, public information, and two-way asymmetrical) may use tactics that are characteristically described as propaganda. When persuasive techniques are used to manipulate, public relations borders on and may even cross over into propaganda. Propaganda is one-way communication aimed on one hand at defeating or paralyzing the enemy and on the other hand at persuading a country's citizens to support its war efforts. Some forms of public relations are obviously propaganda. Only symmetrical communication is immune from charges of being propaganda.

Ellul (1965) claims that people who have been subjected to the complete forces of propaganda admit that propaganda is effective. However, "those who see it from afar, who are not directly subjected to it, who do not witness opinion-changes caused by propaganda ... fail to see the true propaganda practiced on them" (p. 287). He says this is the reason American socio-psychologists deny the effectiveness of propaganda, but admit that public relations is successful. Public relations, he claims, is the form propaganda takes in the United States.

The mass media become the agents of propaganda in times of war. "Lacking a substantive knowledge base or a theoretical framework through which to organize knowledge, journalists became the faithful recorders of a fragmented, factual reality described by official sources" (James, 1991, p. 45). In peace time up to 50 percent of news stories find their basis in public relations (Brown, 2009). During wartime those figures are likely much higher. Without complicit media co-operation, it's impossible for public relations to do its job.

Government Use of Public Relations

In times of war governments use public relations to persuade the public of the need for wars and to support them. As Smith (2004) writes, "Democratic nations, in particular, must win the support of their citizens before committing armed forces to battle, and maintain that support for the duration of hostilities and beyond" (p. 893). However, while the connection of public relations to war is apparent, it also has "raised ethical questions about the means and ends of public relations in the pursuit of war" (Smith, 2004, p. 893). "Excellent" public relations is aimed at resolving conflict and encouraging change rather than supporting the goals of war.

According to Smith (2004), trends in the nature of warfare have changed the public relations of combatants. Traditional warfare among nations or groups of nations has been replaced with civil wars where ethnic, religious, economic, or racial groups fight other groups in the same country or region. Factions that can control the media can influence public opinion regionally. Similarly, they work through the international media to apply international pressure on their opponents. International coverage of regional wars has increased with the global reach of media organizations, like the BBC and CNN. The need for public diplomacy has increased as nations increasingly see the need to make their viewpoints known in the court of public opinion. Whether statements are from government leaders or information officers the goal is the same: to get the media to accept and publish the official line.

The connection of public relations to warfare raises a number of ethical questions, writes Smith (2004). First is the contradiction between military goals and public interest. Public affairs officers want to justify military action to domestic and international publics, while at the same time controlling information that might undermine military operations. Only if one can rationalize that the public interest is best served by going to war, do these goals even become credible. When the justification for war is based on misleading and false information, the justification for war is exacerbated further. In these cases the line between public relations and propaganda becomes very thin.

A second factor that affects the ethics of public relations in wartime is when the government and the military seek to influence the content of the media reports or to shape the official statements issued during a conflict. For national security, operational secrecy, and the safety of personnel involved, during wartime government generally has greater ability to restrict information to the media and by extension to the public. However, this can also lead to greater abuses of power and cover-ups.

Problem statement

Grunig (1993) applies the asymmetrical and symmetrical models of public relations to ethics in international public relations. He concludes that two-way symmetrical communication will resolve international conflict. The following questions drawn from his framework for analysis might similarly guide an analysis of ethics and warfare. Which of Grunig's models of public relations direct the practice of public relations during warfare? How do the models affect the ethics of public relations? What role does propaganda play in public relations and warfare? Is it possible to practice two-way symmetrical public relations in a war setting?

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND WARFARE

Public relations has had a role in warfare from the beginning of recorded history. In ancient Greece, Alexander the Great understood the importance of public image just as the early colonists recognized the need for public opinion in their struggle against England in the American Revolution (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2006). Propaganda efforts of the American revolutionaries were so successful that one-sixth of the total Hessian force fighting for Britain deserted. This brief history examines public relations and warfare in the United States beginning in the 20th Century up to the present time. It is not a complete history, but rather is illustrative of the use of public relations to promote warfare during the past century. It looks at the role of public relations in getting the United States into World War I, the power of film in uniting the nation in World War II, and the marshalling of U.S. public opinion to support both the Gulf War and the current war in Iraq.

The Creel Committee and World War I

During World War I public relations was used as a means of getting a reluctant population to support the war cause. President Woodrow Wilson called on veteran news reporter George Creel to form what became known as the Creel Committee on Public Information (CPI). The committee's use of government propaganda was extremely successful in influencing U.S. and

world opinion and convincing the public to support the war. Among those who served on the committee were Edward Bernays, the nephew of Sigmund Freud, and Carl Byoir, the CPI's associate chair. Both later were to have successful careers in public relations and both made important contributions to the field of PR.

For a public information effort to be successful all government agencies need to be on board in its implementation. Creel and his colleagues sought to tutor their associates in the U.S. government and in its allies to the importance of public opinion in the war effort. One example illustrates this activity. Bernays, who was working in the committee's Foreign Press Bureau in New York, was successful in persuading the Czechoslovakian government to declare its independence on a Sunday rather than a Friday so as to get better press coverage (Sorenson, 1968).

While successful in getting public support for the war, in peace the Creel Committee failed. Creel and eleven associates went to Versailles with Wilson to promote the peace agreement. However, Congressional Republicans accused Creel of manipulating the press. Instead of ignoring the criticism, Creel left press relations to an inexperienced public information officer. The government failed to make its position clear to the press and to the American public. Later Bernays said that if Creel and his publicists had been left to do their work, Wilson would have been successful in informing the American public of his goals and "the course of history possibly altered" (Sorenson, 2006, p. 89). After the war all government public information efforts ceased.

As part of his duties during the war, Byoir built relationships with and directed propaganda toward European ethnic groups in U.S. cities in an effort to get them to support the U.S. war effort. Byoir helped to organize formal groups, one of which was the Lithuanian National Council. After the war, Byoir asked Bernays to develop a campaign for the Lithuanian National Council. In the campaign, Bernays used many of the techniques of the public information model, including sending articles to editors of newspapers, syndicate features and trade papers. Each story helped to emphasize the message that "Lithuania, the little republic on the Baltic, the bulwark against Bolshevism, was carrying on a fight for recognition in accord with the principle of self-determination laid down by President Wilson" (Grunig, 1993, pp. 150-151). Bernays used Freud's concepts of psychology of the subconscious to manipulate public opinion, as he advised presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Eisenhower. In 1954, he directed the use of propaganda to help topple Guatemala's left-leaning government. Those same techniques set the pattern for future propaganda campaigns in Cuba and Vietnam (Tye, 1998, p. 156).

In 1933 the new Nazi government in Germany turned to Ivy Lee, a pioneer in U.S. public relations, for advice. Lee's firm was hired for \$25,000 a year by the German Dye Trust, I.G. Farben, which invited him to Germany to meet Adolf Hitler and propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. In 1934 Congress investigated Lee, accusing him of being a Nazi propagandist. As a result in 1938 Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requiring anyone doing work for a foreign government in the U.S. to register with the Justice Department (Stauber & Rampton, 1995).

World War II and the Office of War Information

During World War II, the U.S. government again called upon public relations and media professionals to gain public support for the war effort. President Franklin Roosevelt asked Elmer Davis, a veteran newsman to head up the Office of War Information (OWI), to serve similar functions as the Creel Committee. Davis had more tools with which to work, including feature length movies, newsreels, and radio broadcasts (Fearn-Banks, 2004).

Propaganda became works of art during World War II. Hollywood was “enthusiastic” when the United States finally entered World War II. Political and social issues were put in the background, while filmmakers focused on “optimistic stories of heroism, patriotism and antifascism” (Christensen & Haas, 2005, p. 92). Among the most renowned World War II movies were a series of seven films by director Frank Capra, called *Why We Fight*. Originally intended as morale boosters for the soldiers, the movies soon became popular among the civilian public. The *Why We Fight* films defined American war objectives to military and civilian audiences around the world (Culbert, 1983).

Congress opposed the domestic operation of OWI, curtailing its funds. By 1944 OWI operated mainly overseas. In 1945 the international operations were turned over to the Department of State and after the war the Department of Defense managed its own public relations. The post-WWII years saw a proliferation of public affairs officers in government. During the Cold War the United States increased its radio broadcasts to populations in Communist countries. As the emergence of new technologies made it easier for propagandists to reach their target audiences, world public opinion became a greater factor in influencing public policy in times of war and peace (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2006).

By the 1960s, the military had over 1000 public information or public affairs officers. In Vietnam, the American media, which at first sold the war to the public, later turned against the government propagandists, using daily reports of body counts as the means to sway the public. This image of dead American youth, as much as anything, turned public opinion against the war. Vietnam was both a military and a public relations failure. Learning from Vietnam, the military controlled the public relations in Grenada and the Persian Gulf War by keeping the media away from the battle front. Although the media objected to the censorship, they readily repeated what they learned in military briefings and from military-produced videos (Smith, 2004).

A news blackout occurred during the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. The media found out about the invasion only after it had happened. After the press protested the blackout, the Department of Defense agreed that “a pool of regular Pentagon reporters” would accompany U.S. forces on any future invasions. Stauber and Rampton (1995) claim that the pool approach is a classic public relations tactic to manage crises. While the government claims the pool provides greater access to information and protects reporters, in fact it controls their access to the battleground.

The first test of the pool system came about in 1989 when U.S. troops invaded Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega. Reporters were confined on a U.S. base for the first five hours of the invasion while military public affairs officers controlled the information they received. Little real

information reached the American public. By the time the press was allowed outside the base, the major fighting was over.

Selling War in the Persian Gulf

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, most Americans were against a war to free the oil rich country. To gain support for the Gulf War in 1991, Citizens for a Free Kuwait, a third-party front for the Kuwaiti government, hired the world's largest PR firm, Hill and Knowlton, for \$10.7 million to oversee and plan a public relations campaign to mobilize U.S. opinion to force Saddam Hussein out of the country. In addition, the government of Kuwait funded as many as 20 other public relations, law and lobby firms. The Rendon Group received a retainer of \$100,000 per month for media work, and Neill & Co. received \$50,000 per month for lobbying Congress. Another \$7.7 million in advertising and lobbying dollars went to two front groups, the "Coalition for Americans at Risk" and the "Freedom Task Force." In addition to placing television and newspaper ads, the Coalition had fifty speakers ready for pro-war rallies and publicity events.

Running Hill and Knowlton's Washington office was Craig Fuller, one of President George H. W. Bush's closest friends and inside political advisors. Frank Mankiewicz, who served as press secretary and advisor to Robert F. Kennedy and George McGovern, managed the news media. Under his direction, Hill and Knowlton arranged hundreds of meetings, briefings, calls and mailings directed toward the editors of daily newspapers and other media outlets. Documents filed with the U.S. Department of Justice showed that 119 company executives in 12 offices across the U.S. were overseeing the Kuwait account. The PR firm organized a press conference with "a so-called Kuwaiti freedom fighter," a "National Prayer Day" service for Kuwaiti and American servicemen, and "Free Kuwait" rallies at 21 college campuses. It promoted an Islamic art tour, produced advertisements and video news releases (VNRs), arranged luncheons with journalists and spent more than \$1 million polling the American people. The dozens of video news releases cost over half a million dollars. The VNRs were shown by TV news directors around the world who rarely (if ever) identified the source of the stories. TV stations and networks "simply fed the carefully-crafted propaganda to unwitting viewers, who assumed they were watching 'real' journalism" (Stauber & Rampton, 1995, p. 171).

Perhaps, the Hill and Knowlton's greatest coup was in providing witnesses to a Congressional hearing. On October 10, 1990, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus held a hearing on Capitol Hill which provided the first opportunity for formal presentations of Iraqi human rights violations. Hill and Knowlton wrote the scripts for the witnesses, coached them, and produced videos detailing Iraqi atrocities. A 15-year Kuwaiti girl, Nayirah, told the hearing that she had witnessed Iraqi soldiers take babies from hospital incubators in Kuwait and leave them on the floor to die.

Three months passed between Nayirah's testimony and the start of the war. During those months, the story of babies torn from their incubators was repeated over and over again. Even President Bush told the story. It was recited as fact in Congressional testimony, on TV and radio talk shows, and at the UN Security Council. On January 12, the U.S. Senate voted by a narrow, five-vote margin to support the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq. The babies-thrown-from-incubators story may have been a factor in the close vote. Only after the start of the war did the

media discover that the testimony was completely false. The girl was the Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter, who had been coached by Hill and Knowlton staff (Grunig, 1993; Stauber & Rampton, 1995).

Even as the military build-up in the Persian Gulf began, in a secret strategy memo, the Pentagon outlined a plan "to constrain and control journalists." A massive public affairs operation would ensure that no unfavorable or uncensored reporting got to the U.S. public. Public information officers would escort the media representatives at all times.

Within days the overwhelming technological superiority of U.S. forces won a decisive victory. "The American public's single most lasting memory of the war will probably be the ridiculously successful video stunts supplied by the Pentagon showing robot 'smart bombs' striking only their intended military targets, without much 'collateral' (civilian) damage" (Stauber & Rampton, 1995, p. 174). Only after the bombing had ended did the media realize how devastating the battle had been. Afterwards, some in the media suggested that they'd been manipulated to produce "sanitized coverage" which ignored the war's human cost.

9/11 and the War in Iraq

Following 9/11, the U.S. media became complicit in a plot to take America once again into war. Journalists asked few questions, instead passively accepting and promoting the George W. Bush administration point of view. Anyone who didn't was branded a traitor for supporting terrorism. "What is clear ... is that the American press corps enabled the Bush administration to cocoon the public to such an extent that it had only a vague notion about alternative viewpoints and policy options, or the consequences of American policy decisions worldwide" (Finnegan, 2007, p. 2). "The line was drawn in the sand early, and members of the media chose to fall in step" (Finnegan, 2007, p. xix). For example, CBS's Dan Rather wept as he pledged: "George Bush is the president.... Wherever he wants me to line up, just tell me where" (Finnegan, 2007, p. xix). This atmosphere following 9/11 made the media vulnerable to government PR efforts, including disinformation and lying.

Again, as in previous conflicts, the expertise of public relations consultants was used to assure the government agenda was successful. The Pentagon secretly awarded PR practitioner John Rendon a \$16 million contract to use propaganda to target Iraq and other adversaries. He used a strategy of "perception management" to manipulate information and the news media to achieve the desired result. Rendon was not new to government work. He played roles in the toppling of Panama's President Manuel Noriega, the first Gulf War, the Balkans, and Haiti. His firm, The Rendon Group (TRG), had made millions from government contracts since 1991, when it was hired by the CIA to help "create the conditions for the removal of Hussein from power" (Bamford, 2005, p. 1). In 1991, Rendon assembled a group of anti-Saddam militants that he called the Iraqi National Congress (INC). In 1992, Rendon protégé Ahmed Chalabi was put in charge of the group. Rendon served as their media consultant and "senior adviser" in order to engineer an uprising against Saddam.

Although later it was shown that there was no connection between Iraq and the perpetrators of 9/11, Rendon was nevertheless successful in demonizing Saddam Hussein. Through Chalabi,

Rendon fed the media false news stories of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. He chose Judith Miller of *The New York Times* to write the story that would be the catalyst for more stories about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Miller, who was close to I. Lewis Libby and other neoconservatives in the Bush administration, had been a trusted outlet for the INC's anti-Saddam propaganda for years. Miller flew to Bangkok to interview an Iraqi defector who claimed to have information about weapons of mass destruction. Her front-page story, published December 20th, 2001, was “exactly the kind of exposure Rendon had been hired to provide” (Bamford, 2005, p. 1). The problem was that her story was a lie (Bamford, 2004, 2005).

In explaining her behavior, Miller said, “My job isn’t to assess the government’s information and be an independent analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of *The New York Times* what the government thought about Iraq’s arsenal” (Loewenstein, 2004, p. 7). In accepting government propaganda, she completely ignored contrary viewpoints that disagreed with the Bush administration’s position on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This is a classic example of how the media become purveyors of the official government position.

“The entire story may have been little more than a U.S. sponsored psychological warfare effort—The Rendon Group’s speciality—to gin up the American public’s fear over Saddam Hussein. If so, it would have been illegal under U.S. law, which forbids the use of taxpayer money to propagandize the American public” (Bamford, 2004, p. 298).

Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector in Iraq, said: “I think what you’re seeing is the need for the United States government to turn to commercial enterprises like The Rendon Group to do the kind of lying and distortion of truth in terms of peddling disinformation to the media that the government normally can’t do for itself” (Ritter cited in Bamford, 2004, p. 298).

New media technology has changed coverage of war and military public relations (Smith, 2004). In the Iraq War, satellites, mobile technology and the Internet made it practically impossible to censor coverage from the front. Rather than control the content of coverage, the military co-opted the American media, embedding them with the advancing soldiers. The American media saw favorable coverage as part of their patriotic duty. Coverage was greater than in previous wars, requiring military public affairs officers to monitor and respond to a greater variety of questions. Foreign media were not as easily controlled. They were often ignored and isolated, and even targeted as enemy combatants. Except through the Internet, their message was practically unheard in the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

In studying international public relations, Grunig (1993) found that asymmetrical models of public relations dominate the examples of public relations and international affairs. Similarly, as described in this paper, asymmetrical models are used in public relations and warfare. Table 1 shows that the predominant public relations models practiced in times of war are public information, personal influence, and two-way asymmetrical.

TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF MODELS USED TO MANIPULATE PUBLIC AND MEDIA

Event	Public relations model	Characteristics	Examples
World War I	Public information Personal influence	One-way communications Asymmetrical Used media and interpersonal relations Unethical Propaganda	Manipulated public opinion Convinced public to support war Used personal influence with other nations Focused on ethnic groups Organized front groups Articles sent to media
World War II and after	Public information Personal influence Two-way asymmetrical	One-way communications Asymmetrical Used media and interpersonal relations Unethical Propaganda Research based	Researched audiences Gained public support for war Movies, newsreels, radio Propaganda film series “Why We Fight” Increase use of public affairs officers (PAOs) Used technology to bypass media Military control of media
The Gulf War	Public information Personal influence Two-way asymmetrical	One-way communications Asymmetrical Used media and interpersonal relations Unethical Propaganda Research based	Researched audiences Gained public support for war Foreign hiring of PR firms, lawyers and lobbyists TV and newspaper ads, speakers, meetings, briefings, calls, mailings Prayer days, rallies, VNRs Lied in testimony before Congress PIOs used to control, censor media Used video to show bombing
The Iraq War	Public information Personal influence Two-way asymmetrical	One-way communications Asymmetrical Used media and interpersonal relations Unethical Propaganda Research based	Manipulated public support Silenced dissident voices in media Secret use of PR firms Used perception management Used psychological warfare Manipulated and lied to media Establishment of front groups Used personal influence with reporters Made false claims about WMD Used lies and distortion of the facts Embedded media with soldiers Appealed to patriotism of reporters Controlled, isolated foreign media

Although this is by no means a complete history of public relations, the pattern as shown here is one of propaganda and deceit. The use of public relations is highly unethical. As set forth by Smith (2004), the ultimate purpose of public relations in the examples was to persuade the public to accept the need to go to war and to support the war while it was going on. This is illustrated most recently by the hiring of public relations firms to involve America in both the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003. The hiring of PR firms supports the view that governments see the need for the use of public relations to persuade and manipulate the public to support war. Also, third-party organizations, as used by Byoir to achieve the goals of the Creel Committee in

World War I, are still used today. This is illustrated by the formation of Citizens for a Free Kuwait in the Gulf War and the Iraqi National Congress in the Iraq War.

Propaganda was used as a tactic in both World War I and II and continues to be used in recent examples. Propaganda is characterized by the use of “one-sided, half truths” to persuade public opinion as was the case in both the Congressional hearings of the Gulf War and the false news coverage of the Iraq War. Clearly, the nature of communications during warfare leads to deception as a means of justifying warfare and controlling information. The amount of information is greatly restricted and the accuracy decreases. This is worsened when the media are co-opted by governments and become their agents of propaganda. Communications and public relations are clearly both unethical and socially irresponsible as illustrated by the models used for public relations and the employment of propaganda.

Grunig (1993), claims that, if public relations is practiced according to the principles of strategic management, public responsibility and the two-way symmetrical model, it will help “to build relationships among organizations and publics and to develop policies that are responsible to those publics” (p. 157). In an international setting, he indicates that a failure to follow these principles may be because the majority of public relations practitioners who work for international clients enter the business because of experience in journalism, advertising or politics. “Because of this background, they devote most of their efforts to media relations and lobbying, typically practicing the press agency, public information or two-way asymmetrical models of public relations” (Grunig, 1993, p. 158). Similar patterns exist in public relations and warfare, but not because of the background of practitioners. In public relations and warfare, deception is both a tactic and purpose of communications.

According to Grunig (1993), ethical decision making is facilitated if public relations practitioners follow the two-way symmetrical model. In that model, they would assist government to negotiate decisions that would serve both the interests of the government as well as the public. Grunig recommends two symmetrical principles of openness. The first is full disclosure of source of informational materials. A second principle is that practitioners discontinue the use of front organizations and openly acknowledge the name of their real clients.

“Open, symmetrical communication as exemplified by these two changes in current public relations practice would enhance, rather than cloud, ‘decent and rational, unemotional debate’” (Grunig, 1993, pp. 161-162). While symmetrical public relations would eliminate most ethical problems of international public relations, it is unlikely a symmetrical model would be accepted for public relations of warfare. It is aimed at peacefully resolving conflicts and doesn’t fit into the war paradigm. The purpose of public relations in warfare is to persuade and restrict information and it is unlikely that this will change.

A normative theory describes what ought to be. A positive theory describes what is. Grunig’s models blend normative and positive theory. Grunig (1993) claims that the two-way symmetrical model of public relations applied in an international setting will resolve conflict and bring about change. This is a normative view. Applied to war the result would be peace. However, the reality (what is) is something different. The goals of governments in entering into warfare are not peace, but rather defeating their enemies. They use public relations to further these aims, both in

persuading the public to go to war and to continue supporting the war once the nation is involved.

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